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 This thesis examines the influence of domestic nationalist movements on bilateral 
relations between China and Japan.  I will use Two-level game theory as the primary 
analytical framework.  Two-level theory provides a useful lens for examining policy 
formation at discrete stages, domestic, international, and domestic again in order to ratify 
international agreements.  I will examine three primary cases through this framework to 
study the effects of domestic nationalism on bilateral diplomacy between Japan and 
China.  The East China Sea Dispute is the only actual territorial dispute between Japan 
and China.  The Yasukuni Shrine controversy and the textbook controversy are both 
discrete elements of a larger dispute over war memory and guilt, as well as construction 
of historical narratives for political purpose.  I will seek to show that domestic 
nationalism has a strong limiting effect on the ways in which China and Japan are able to 
interact with each other on the global stage, as leaders must retain their legitimacy against 
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Chapter 1: Regional Relations 
 The diplomatic history between China and Japan has been peppered with 
numerous difficulties that impede regional cooperation and security.  This is in spite of 
the increasing importance that international ties hold for both nations, particularly ties 
with each other.  I will seek to explore some of  why these powers cannot come to an 
agreement on several key issues through the use of two level game theory and 
investigation of nationalist movements.  Making the assertion that domestic politics have 
an effect on international policy is not particularly controversial, but the specifics can be 
difficult to trace.  There are, however, several specific incidents in which the policies and 
interactions of Chinese and Japanese foreign policy leaders were shaped or forced by the 
actions of domestic nationalists. 
 Some of the cases that have derailed smooth relations seem small.  Why does it 
matter if a prime minister visits a shrine dedicated to war dead?  Who cares what is 
written in Japanese middle-school textbooks?  How is arresting the skipper of a fishing 
trawler a major international incident?  All of these questions have answers that lie in the 
complicated and painful history of Sino-Japanese relations.  Much of this conflict 
originates in the second Sino-Japanese War and its long-term aftermath.  Old wounds are 
re-opened easily, and there are strong feelings that Japan has not done enough to make up 
for its war legacy.   
 This has resulted in the presentation of even small issues like misstatements by 
Japanese ministers as  part of an ongoing post-war narrative within China.  Japan, 
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meanwhile, often considers the matter of the war settled as the result of an agreement 
concluded with Mao during the normalization of relations in 1972, and many years of 
Official Development Aid (ODA) to China.  Why then do Chinese activists persist in 
demanding Japanese apologies?  Why do Japanese ultra-nationalists deny the existence of 
well-documented events such as the Nanjing Massacre?  How do these voices affect 
bilateral relations?   
 Nationalism is quite simply the identification of individuals with a political entity.  
Often this is the modern concept of a “nation,” a land-holding state with clearly (or 
almost clearly) marked borders.  Nationalist narratives are often constructed to give the 
nation a much longer historical thread.  Historically, nationalism emerged with 
industrialization and the modernization of communications, allowing much tighter 
administration of far larger numbers of people—people who often did not identify very 
strongly with each other.  Nationalist movements often glorify and essentialize the 
concept of their nation, speaking of “intrinsic character” of their particular state, and 
conflating the state with the people.  This is not inherently negative, but  nationalism is 
easily manipulated to serve xenophobic or militarily aggressive ends.   
 Nationalism is a double-edged sword which states must employ carefully, in that 
they are building a mob that hungers for national glory.  If the leadership fails the tests 
they have set themselves, they can face an angry, organized, and mobilized populace.  If 
they name an enemy, they can find it impossible to negotiate peacefully without 
alienating their forces at home. 
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 Nationalism in Japan not spark the same kind of intense national introspection 
that characterized Germany after World War II.  Instead,  the LDP government of the 
“1955 system” relied upon a strong nationalist bloc of voters as a key unshakable 
constituency for its leaders.  This bloc moved swiftly after the war to consolidate their 
position, which included a minimum of purging and examination of wartime behavior, 
particularly by officials and especially not of the emperor. The concept of “national 
repentance” did not take hold in the public consciousness.
1
 
   Japanese nationalism has been shaped heavily by aspirations for peace, and even 
those who glorify the worst of Japan's Imperial past claim to be doing so in the name of 
greater peace. The recent change of governing parties has caused the nationalist groups to 
lose some influence in national politics, though they are still a force to be reckoned with.  
The prestige and power of Japan is paramount to these elements in Japanese society and 
government.   
 Nationalism in China has experienced considerable top-down influence in recent 
decades. The sagging of Communist ideology had to be replaced and brewing unrest 
under reforms had to be minimized.  Culminating in the patriotic education campaigns of 
the 1990s, China has experienced a massive surge in nationalistic feeling.
2
  Much of this 
sentiment has been shaped through presentation of China's national struggle against a 
hostile outer world, paying particular attention to the second Sino-Japanese war.  
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Outbreaks of nationalist expression in China are sometimes orchestrated by the state, but 
crowds are difficult beasts to control.  China's exploding nationalistic sentiment is fueled 
by an expanding popular media that is increasingly free to print what it wishes, especially 
on the subject of opposition to Japan. 
 These national movements affect foreign policy by creating a rivalrous 
atmosphere between Japan and China.  While they do not generally advocate for war, as 
some nationalistic movements have in the past, they certainly advocate for victory of 
their nation over the opposing nation in whatever issue is being contested.  In Japan, they 
were a necessary political bloc for the ruling party and remain a strong political force.  In 
China, the nationalist narrative has created a wider, popular nationalist movement.  This 
narrative creates some of the current government's legitimacy in having fought off the 
Japanese invaders during World War II, and in fighting now for China's proper place in 
the world. 
 Two-Level Games 
 Two-level game theory was first introduced by Robert Putnam.  In essence, 
Putnam argues that all international politics are influenced by domestic politics and the 
limitations are imposed on negotiations by domestic coalitions.
3
  Most simply, one could 
view international and domestic policymaking as two game boards in which moves made 
upon one board are reflected upon the other.  International negotiations are referred to as 
“Level I” and domestic negotiations required to secure an agreement at the international 
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level are referred to as “Level II.”  Putnam argued that all foreign policy negotiations are 
actually two-level games, to the extent that they are reflected on both boards.  He rejected 
the unitary actor model of foreign policy negotiations in which leaders set policy and then 
enforce it domestically, with domestic politics having little effect on the process of 
negotiations. 
 Two-level game theory was primarily devised with regards to the formation of 
treaties, though not all negotiations or incidents between nations results in an agreement.  
Leaders must negotiate effectively as they can within constraints created by their 
domestic concerns in order to create an agreement that can be ratified.  In the case of 
liberal democracies, ratification usually involves seeking the approval of a domestic 
legislative or bureaucratic body with oversight powers.  In non-democratic societies, 
there is often a domestic support game or even individual career concerns which affect 
the acceptance or rejection of an agreement.   
 This creates a win-set for each side in a negotiation, with acceptable outcomes 
forming a spectrum.  Areas of acceptable win-sets that overlap between sides create the 
compatible win-sets for a given scenario.  The compatible win-sets for a given scenario 
are limited not just by what the negotiating executive at Level I is able to work out with 
their counterpart, but also what will be accepted by the domestic coalition at Level II.  
 The negotiating executive, while not a unitary actor, still has their own interests 
which they will represent in negotiations.  Leaders will not make treaties which would 
force them to rebuild their domestic coalitions of support, even if that treaty might be 
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acceptable to a majority of their general public.  
  If no compatible win-set exists, negotiations will most likely fail.  Leaders  try to 
negotiate for the maximum possible advantage within the shared acceptable range in 
order to craft a successful agreement.  If a leader produces an agreement that oversteps 
domestic constraints, they may be threatened with involuntary defection, which is the 
failure of ratification or adoption of a treaty.  An example of this is Woodrow Wilson 
after World War I and the Treaty of Versailles.  Leaders will use the threat of involuntary 
defection in order to receive more favorable terms, but too much insistence upon the 
threat of defection can cause negotiations to fail entirely.   
 Lastly, domestic and international policymaking does not simply move directly 
from domestic support-building to foreign policymaking to ratification.  There are often 
rapid alterations and side-payments made to domestic factions in order to receive key 
support, making the two game boards very busy places indeed.  Leaders therefore will 
often use side-payments and pre-negotiation consensus-building to create a viable win-set 
for negotiations on favorable terms.  
 Putnam focused his theory solely on negotiations that were aimed at securing 
formal agreements.  However, the theory can be extended farther than that.  Many 
diplomatic issues or statements are influenced by domestic concerns, and while a 
successful treaty could be considered an end to a particular “game,” the ongoing process 
of international interaction continues with influences drawn from Level I and Level II.  In 
cases such as these the concept of ratification is not applicable, but leaders most 
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assuredly make decisions with domestic approval in mind and can suffer considerable 
career damage through missteps.   
 This theory can be applied to Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations.  The actions by 
each side (or actor) are rational decisions within a two-level split between domestic and 
foreign policy goals. The domestic goals of nationalists and creation of nationalistic 
narratives often requires a fairly intractable position that can be perceived abroad as 
“strong,” such as the positions required of Cold War-era US presidents when dealing with 
leaders of the USSR.  The domestic policy frames used by China and Japan are often 
based upon narratives that are incompatible with each other at Level I, and are created  
with the aim of securing domestic support.  This negotiating frame does not allow for 
successful agreement on many major issues..  It only allows the creation of domestic 
prestige through perceived ideological or territorial victory over the other power. 
 In these cases, the “transaction benefits” of failure to successfully reach an 
agreement are sufficient to create incentives for no-agreement in order to fit within the 
dialogue of political legitimacy employed by domestic factions.  These “transaction 
benefits” are primarily domestic political capital which can be necessary for pursuit of a 
leader's agenda.  The victory conditions of the game become narrowed to causing damage 
to the other party. As a result harmonious relations between the two powers become 
extremely difficult.  
Cases 
 The last decade in Sino-Japanese relations is peppered with occasional incidents 
8 
 
which by themselves do not have a major impact on relations, but form a greater trend of 
disharmony.  Major incidents or very long-running disputes make up the body of the 
cases examined here.  The cases are meant to be representative of the major obstacles 
towards building a more harmonious relationship between Japan and China.  
 The first and probably most major issue is the East China Sea dispute, including 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.  The maritime borders of the East China Sea weren't a 
matter of great contention until the 1970s when surveys disclosed large deposits of oil 
and natural gas under the seabed.  The ownership of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands also 
became a contested issue at this time due to the islands' proximity to these deposits.   
 This is one of the only disputes between China and Japan involving physical 
territory.  The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are a lingering issue of contention from World 
War II-era treaty agreements which leave some doubt about the status of the islands.  
Even their status as “islands” is in dispute, and whether or not they qualify for that term 
under existing sea law is vital to determining certain territorial claims upon the seabed 
resources.   
 The Diaoyu/Senkaku landforms themselves have also become important national 
symbols to diehards in both China and Japan.  Incidents such as Japanese nationalists 
building a lighthouse on one of the islands has then forced an international response from 
both respective governments.  
  Most recently, a Chinese fishing trawler collided with a Japanese Coast Guard 
boat in what Japan claimed as territorial waters.  The arrest and eventual release of the 
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crew of the vessel was a major international incident that caused the cancellation of 
several other scheduled talks between Japan and China, some specifically about the East 
China Sea issue.
4
    
 Large protests occurred in both China and Japan over the handling of the issue by 
the opposing governments.  Japan could not easily make concessions in the handling of 
the crew or the boat lest they seem to be acknowledging China's claim.  China had to 
maintain a position of demanding immediate return of their citizens from an illegal arrest, 
lest they seem to acknowledge Japan's  territorial claims.  In this sense, no compatible 
win-set existed, and the eventual outcome of the  release satisfied neither party.   
 Officials confronted with these matters have to code their responses to placate 
nationalistic factions on the domestic side, and they have little reason to be conciliatory 
on this issue when large natural resource reserves are ultimately at stake.  In this way, the 
nationalistic demands of Level II can be seen as both fueling international disagreement, 
and being utilized by officials at Level I as a means of reinforcing a resistant position.  
This, combined with other complicated maritime legal wrangling has created a fine 
territorial mess in these waters. 
 The second major case involves visits to Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese prime 
ministers, particularly Koizumi.  The Yasukuni Shrine houses the war dead from the 
Meiji era forward, including several Class-A war criminals who had previously been 
enshrined elsewhere.  Japanese ultra-nationalism has at its heart several war-bereaved 
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societies formed after the war by grieving families and veterans.  Simply honoring the 
loss of persons killed in war is not so serious, but their goals also include the denial and 
downplaying of  wartime atrocities committed by soldiers in order to maintain national 
pride.  Yasukuni shrine is supported almost exclusively by these groups.  The shrine also 
operates a museum that promotes a glorified nationalist view of Japanese participation in 
WWII,  one that presents the war as a glorious attempt to liberate Asia from Western 
colonial domination. 
 Ministerial visits to the shrine are presented as “personal visits” by officials, but 
other Asian nations feel differently.  Most vocally, China and Korea object to these visits 
by Japanese officials.  Nations invaded by Japan during the Imperial era feel that visits to 
the shrine by government officials represent Japan's ongoing lack of genuine contrition 
for their Imperial past, and that it is disrespectful to those damaged in the war.  This is 
particularly the case with the enshrinement of the Class-A criminals.  
 Perceptions of the Japanese are influenced by the ongoing support of the shrine, 
while Japan sees this as undue interference in its domestic affairs.  From the perspective 
of two-level games, this is a clear division in which a prime minister must walk a very 
careful path in order to retain their constituency among the nationalist factions while 
avoiding the alienation of neighbors.  Thus far, prime ministers who have made the 
choice to visit the shrine have not been able to balance Level I relations with 
appeasement of Level II constituents.  
 While Japan considers these visits to be a domestic and even private matter, the 
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fact that China has made such vocal protest against ministerial visits creates a Level I 
discussion that Japan must answer in some fashion, even if the choice is often a simple 
dismissal of the issue.  The issues of unresolved war legacies between China and Japan 
looms large when the shrine comes up.  This creates a direct intrusion of the international 
into the domestic, and suddenly the Level II process is more directly a part of the Level I 
game, in the actions of prime ministers and responses of Japanese citizen-groups, 
nationalist and otherwise.   
 This does not destroy Two-level interaction, but in it does create a situation in 
which domestic actions are thrust onto the world stage.  It is unlikely that a compatible 
win-set can be achieved for such a scenario, as Japan is faced with the choice of 
sacrificing what it perceives as its own autonomy to a foreign demand, or offending the 
requesting neighbor.  China, meanwhile, must demand that Japanese officials cease their 
visits in order to retain legitimacy as a guardian of public history and justice for the 
Chinese people. 
  Another Japanese domestic issue that invites criticism from Japan's immediate 
neighbors is the so-called “textbook controversy,” an ongoing dispute about the contents 
of Japanese history textbooks.  The Japanese Ministry of Education (formally the 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, referred to hereafter as 
MEXT) must approve all textbooks that are to be offered for use in Japanese classrooms.  
Individual school administrations are then able to select their preferred texts from the 
authorized list.  On several different occasions, MEXT has demanded changes in texts 
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that gloss over or idealize Japan's actions during the Imperial era, substituting words like 
“advanced into” for “invade” and “liberated” for “conquered.”  It has also approved 
glaringly inaccurate right-wing texts which receive a very tiny market share, but they 
upset Japan's neighbors by their approval.   
 These descriptions of the Japanese war in Asia are offensive to the nations that 
Japan invaded and damaged during WWII, and so their governments (China and North 
Korea, most fervently) protest to Japan.  The Japanese public itself views the nationalist 
texts with suspicion, and the government has been sued several times by Japanese 
citizens over the textbook approval process.  China, for its own part, is hardly notable for 
its open and honest historical dialogue, and Chinese school textbooks are written and 
approved by the government.  Why then do they kick up such a fuss over something 
representing such a minority viewpoint within the Japanese education system? 
 The answer lies again in scoring domestic points.  The Chinese media latches onto 
these stories and ties them into an ongoing narrative about Japanese militarism. This 
brings up the subject of war guilt and memory in conjunction with the education of youth 
in an idealized version of Japanese history.  The Chinese government makes their formal 
protest, possibly without even the expectation of any action from the Japanese 
government, all in order to show their righteous defense of truth and dignity for the 
homeland.  While these incidents are relatively minor individually, they continue to occur 
during each of MEXT's four-year screening cycles.  The media portrayal of these events 
has left many Chinese with the perception that the controversial textbooks are the 
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majority texts used in Japanese schools. 
 At stake in this controversy is history itself.  The history of the war is 
controversial and many wounds remain.  China's demand at Level I is that Japan take 
action to address its historical legacy through education.  This again thrusts Japanese 
domestic processes directly into the Level I limelight, MEXT's approval process 
becoming a matter of international affairs.  Japan is again faced with accepting a loss of 
its maneuvering space in order to please a neighbor.  There are many Japanese citizens 
who even support the changes that China has demanded of the textbooks, but the 
government has proven unwilling to cede too much in order to retain prestige and support 
from nationalist blocs.   
 In1998 the two governments attempted to create a jointly-authored historical text.
5
  
This committee has to date failed to produce a text, but such an effort seems like it would 
ultimately be a productive answer to some of China's objections.  This sort of effort 
would allow Japan to participate in the academic process without ceding domestic control 
of education.  The largest obstacle that remains is simply the creation of a jointly-
accepted historical narrative. 
 While these incidents do not cause any major damage to Sino-Japanese relations 
in general, they play into the larger narrative of conflict as irritants and complications for 
other ongoing negotiations.  One nation criticizing another in order to score domestic 
points is not uncommon or even unexpected in relations.  Between China and Japan, 
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however, it can sometimes seem to be the primary game with no agreement actually 
sought or immediately possible.  The Level I goal is gaining Level II support, to shore up 
a weakening coalition or maintain a nationalist narrative to a populace wearied by 
ongoing reform.   
Conflict and Consideration 
 There is another, less-overtly vocalized frame in use by both nations. China and 
Japan are contesting each other for regional influence.  Japan's “Lost Decade” has left 
them in a vulnerable position, and China's rapid rise has enabled China to exploit this.  
The Chinese leadership may be chained to maintaining rapid growth to keep the 
population contented with the current government, as few reform regimes last through 
their changes.  Neither will expressly state the goal of achieving regional dominance, as 
this would immediately create conflict.  It does, however, seem to be an implicit contest 
between the two. Historically, China has been the greatest regional power, and reclaiming 
pride of place could be a very strong motivation for the regime.  
 This level of conflict seems incongruous, given that bilateral trade has grown 
steadily almost every year since the normalization of relations in 1972.
6
  However, a 
large number of factors inhibit the development of smooth political relations a the 
national level.  The phrase “Cold Politics, Hot Economy” has often been used to 
characterize the relationship between China and Japan.
7
  Despite the flourishing of intra-
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regional trade, Japan and China are much more likely to see each other as threats to their 
respective security rather than as regional partners.  This rivalry was perhaps brewing on 
the shared-historical back burner before the fall of the Soviet Union.  The loss of  a 
shared threat reduced the necessity of cooperation during China's rapid rise under Dengist 
reform and Japan's “Lost Decade.”   
 China and Japan have a long history of contacts, many of them somewhat hostile.  
Still, it is only in the modern era that they have become rivals.  China suffered 




 centuries, and has only succeeded in creating 
substantial growth in the last thirty years.  Japan grew exponentially before and after 
WWII, becoming a world power in record time.  It is perhaps an accident of history that 
the classical roles of China and Japan are reversed, Japan now holding the upper hand.  
Recently, China has edged out Japan to become the 2
nd
 largest world economy.
8
   
 For a nation of a billion people to have a powerful economy is not so strange, but 
the bilateral rivalry with its neighbor is bitter.  Japan would like to retain its place as the 
main regional power.  Giving in to all of China's demands would quickly destroy what 
remains of Japan's international prestige.  The sense of insecurity among leaders in both 
nations reaches citizens indirectly.  Meanwhile, the stirring of nationalistic sentiments, 
particularly in China, creates an unwillingness among domestic constituencies to accept 
elite compromises when they touch on issues of national pride. 
 Shared cultural history has done little to erase scars of the most recent war 
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between the two states.  While most of the participants in that war are now dead, dueling 
national mythologies of the conflict complicate any full resolution of the historical issues.  
Occasionally an analogy will be made about France and Germany's postwar 
reconciliation with regards to Japan and China. James C. Hsiung explores this theme, but 
ultimately rejects this hypothesis due to Japan's inadequate apology for the past, in 
contrast to Germany's more genuine repentance.
9
  As well, while Germany did conquer 
France, most of Germany's greatest war crimes were committed against the Jews, and so 
the Jewish people were the recipients of most reparations and apologies.  Making 
analogies between different countries seems perpetually doomed to over-generalization 
of complicated issues, though in this case the comparison can be used to express the wish 
for a more complete resolution. 
 It is also noteworthy that Germany did not pay direct reparations to many 
countries involved in the war, but yielded industrial machinery and factories along with 
other German properties that had existed in those countries.  Japan has long held that 
Japanese assets left in China should similarly cover many required reparations.  This, 
combined with the bilateral agreement reached in 1972 that renounced reparations,  left 
many Japanese government officials to conclude that the matter was settled.  However, 
many of the psychological ramifications of wartime events have not been fully addressed, 
most especially the matter of the Comfort Women in China and elsewhere.  Meanwhile, 
the use of ODA as a backhanded form of reparations has never been satisfactory to 
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 Given the historical barriers, domestic political needs, and ideological frames used 
in relations between these nations, it is difficult to find a point where one side can give 
enough to satisfy the other.  In particular, both sides have a difficult domestic game to 
play as well.  Having staked out a hard-line position backed by popular fury, China will 
have difficulty proceeding without concessions from Japan.  Meanwhile, the Japanese 
feel badgered by Chinese demands.  Until recently, Japan was also more hampered by a 
domestic coalition that required strong support from nationalist groups.  Recent moves by 
the cabinet of prime minister Kan Naoto have shed some hope on the situation, however.  
Abstaining from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine and making a war apology is a good first 
step.  It has not been enough to break the deadlock after the later fishing trawler collision 
incident, but such gestures allow for some hope for greater reconciliation. 
 The contest for regional dominance complicates hopes for smoother relations.  
When China makes demands of Japan over Yasukuni or textbooks, they are asking for 
rectification of an injustice at one level.  They are also demanding that Japan agree to 
their wishes in public, and modify internal state matters to the liking of a foreign power.  
It is impossible not to view such requests as compromising Japan's prestige, even when 
the cause is genuine and just.  There are those on the Japanese side who view all such 
requests as an excuse for China to try and browbeat Japan as part of a larger plan to usurp  
regional power. 
 Viewed through this lens, the Level I game again holds incompatible win-sets, as 
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neither China nor Japan are going to willingly sacrifice their position.  The intrusion of 
foreign demands into domestic affairs creates ill-will, even when requested with good 
cause.  The questions of history loom large in Sino-Japanese relations, and their 
resolution is vital to genuine progress.  However, it is difficult to find such a resolution 
when the historical questions become entangled with struggles for regional power and 
prestige.  
Conclusion 
 Many of the contacts between Japan and China in recent years have been less than 
friendly.  There are multiple levels of reasoning for why this is the case.   The Level II 
domestic demands are visible in the Level I interactions between the nations.  The 
domestic nationalism of China and Japan takes different forms, but has ultimately had 
similar effects in chilling relations and provoking international incidents.  The leadership 
in both nations are concerned with regional position and power, as well.  This concern is 
translated to the citizenship indirectly, and feeds into the nationalist currents that desire to 
protect the homeland.  
 The questions of history remain a stumbling block in Sino-Japanese relations, but 
they would not be such an obstacle if politically motivated historical construction were 
not at work in both nations.  The textbook controversy explores this directly, down to 
selections of wording within Japanese texts.  Chinese textbooks do not receive the same 
scrutiny, though they are created through a process even less transparent and open than 
the Japanese system.  This seems somewhat hypocritical and casts a shadow of political 
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motivation over Chinese requests that Japan make amendments to their own educational 
system to suit Chinese needs.  
 War memories are not limited to the education of youth, of course.  They come to 
play in the Yasukuni Shrine controversy and the attention paid to war dead from a violent 
time in Japan's history.  There are legitimate concerns with the veneration of war 
criminals, and these are questions asked by Japanese citizens as well.  The power of 
nationalists in Japanese discourse on the war  colors the response that previous prime 
ministers have made to these questions, and will continue to do so.  The construction of 
nationalism in China has colored the new expanding media, and affected the emerging 
civil discourse on Japan for the worse. 
 These sources of historical tension make other interactions such as trade 
negotiations or territorial resolutions difficult.  The East China Sea and Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands are the most notable example of this.  The islands in particular have provoked a 
very strong nationalist response by citizens of both nations who do not wish their 
governments to “lose” territory, regardless of the actual legal status of the territory in 
question.  The islands themselves are tiny and unimportant except for the way in which 
they affect resource rights in the East China Sea, and so both governments have cause to 
wish to retain them as well.  Reining in the nationalists becomes difficult for the 
leadership then, lest they seem to be acknowledging claims of the other.  
 The intersection of dueling nationalist mythology and contested regional 
hegemony makes for a difficult time in international relations.  Any forward progress 
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made in relations by these nations must be accompanied by reduction of nationalistic 
expressions that penalize leaders for compromising on issues.   
 The following chapters will help to explore and illuminate the origins and process 
of nationalism in both countries, as well as the historical basis of their relationship to 
each other.  Chapter 2 goes directly into the history of Sino-Japanese relations, from 
antiquity into the present, and examines some of the incidents from the second Sino-
Japanese War that have such a lingering impact today, as well as summarizing both 
national perspectives..  Chapters 3 through 5 go into the cases, starting with the East 
China Sea and moving through Yasukuni and the textbook controversy.  Each will 
explain the history and context of the case within the larger pattern of relations.  Chapter 
6 concludes and will explore how the two-level framework shows the flow of interaction 
from domestic to international.   
 The relationship between China and Japan is pivotal for long-term regional 
stability in East Asia, and indeed for our increasingly interconnected world.  For relations 
to be so effectively derailed by some of these incidents, clearly there is more at stake than 
the international interaction itself.  The play of domestic politics upon leaders has a 
powerful effect on their international behavior.  The forces at work in China and Japan 
are often fully opposed to each other, and this creates incompatible international goals 





Chapter 2:  Historical Context 
 China and Japan are both very old civilizations with a long history of shared 
cultural contacts.  There have been many instances of violence between them, but none 
terribly serious until the two Sino-Japanese Wars.  These carried all the destructive power 
of modern warfare with intent to conquer and colonize on the part of the Japanese.  Not 
all contacts between Japan and China have been hostile, however.   For most of their 
history, China and Japan were able to coexist more or less peacefully.  The overriding 
violence of the second Sino-Japanese War simply overpowered any other history between 
the two for decades, and continues to weigh heavily in international exchanges.  
 Pre-modern interactions between the two nations have relatively little bearing on 
modern forms of diplomacy, but it is useful to examine them briefly in order to show the 
continuity of relations, as well as infrequent conflicts.  The regimes within both nations 
changed every few centuries, but the traditions of contact remained.  Sometimes these 
took tributary forms in the case of Japan, sometimes not.  Their relative isolation had 
allowed Japan an independence from China's guiding hand that some of China's other 
neighbors lacked.
10
   
 The general historical events marking Sino-Japanese relations will be recounted 
first. I will  then examine each nation's interpretation of this history of contact along with 
current interests.  This is to demonstrate the differing and sometimes wholly incompatible 
nature of historical narratives used.   
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 The first recorded contacts occurred in around 100-300 CE.  Some cultural 
sharing occurred during this period.  Much of Japan's contact with China came through 
Korea as intermediaries, and this continued for many centuries.
11
  Japan fought one battle 
with the Tang dynasty in 663, on the Korean peninsula, which did not lead to lingering 
hostilities.  Trade was established in this early era, and allowed to continue peacefully 
until the Tokugawa restricted all such contacts in 1633. 
 Piracy became a problem in the coastal waters between China, Japan and Korea in 
the 13
th
 century.  These pirates were called wako, or “Japanese Pirates,” despite many of 
them originating on the Chinese mainland.
12
  These pirates menaced the Chinese and 
Korean coastlines for centuries, provoking several diplomatic clashes between Japan and 
its neighbors.  China and Korea urged Japan to do more to combat the piracy problem.  
There was never enough that could be done, but neither did the three states have the 
resources to “punish” the others militarily for failing to battle the pirates.   
 The Mongol Yuan dynasty of China made two attempts to conquer Japan, also in 
the 13
th
 century.  Kublai Khan twice attempted to invade, and twice was rebuffed.  In 
both instances terrible sea weather destroyed much of the Mongol invasion fleets, a 
phenomenon the Japanese came to call the kamikaze or “Divine Wind.”
13
   
 Arguably the most important pre-modern incident involving Japan and China is 
probably the Korean invasion by Toyotomi Hideyoshi that lasted from 1592-1598.  This 
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invasion did terrible damage to the Korean peninsula, and brought Japan into direct 
conflict with the full power of the Ming dynasty.  The disorganization of the Ming court 
factions hampered their response, though they still succeeded in driving the Japanese off 
the continent.  Ultimately, the invasion seems to be a result of Hideyoshi's limitless 
ambition, though there were trade benefits in Korean and Chinese goods that were  
sought by the Japanese lords.
14
 
 The Tokugawa era of Japan was highly isolationist, to the point of executing 
foreigners caught on Japanese soil.  The Tokugawa were forced into allowing some 
foreign contact in 1853 by an American fleet led by Commodore Matthew Perry.  This 
incident shocked the Japanese into a rapid spurt of modernization and contact with the 
outside world.  Japan aimed to make itself an Imperial power, an equal to the nations of 
Europe. Europeans did not immediately credit Japan's activities, but the Japanese state 
was strong enough to make very rapid changes in industry and civil structure. 
 China, meanwhile, experienced vast upheaval from colonial intrusions upon its 
territory and domestic rebellions such as the Taiping that threatened to tear the state 
apart.  The factions within the Chinese government struggled for power with each other 
over the issue of modernization, and movement to adapt was slowed by these disputes.  
China lost concession after concession to foreigners.     
 In 1895, the first Sino-Japanese war broke out over Korea.  Japan and China both 
felt that the peninsula was vital to their national security interests.  Japan won this war 
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handily, and forced China into several concessions, including Korea's total independence 
from Chinese rule, as well as an enormous sum of war reparations.  For Japan, this war 
demonstrated Japanese progress in modernization to the world, and moved them towards 
being regarded as a world power, holding territorial concessions in other nations. For 
China, it was a crushing defeat that further crippled the struggling dynastic government to 
rule effectively and enforced a humiliating concession to what had always previously 
been a lesser nation. 
 The worst was yet to come, however.  Japan's aggression continued within the 
Asia-Pacific region, and Japan's rapid growth was sharply contrasted with China's 
struggle with civil war and famine.  The axis of regional power had shifted to Japan after 
the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, and they worked tirelessly to enhance their 
position in world affairs.  Japan joined with European powers in fighting against the 
Boxer rebellion, and demanding further concessions afterwards. 
 In 1915, Japan saw an opportunity to expand its sphere of influence in China, and 
sent an ultimatum in the form of the “Twenty-One Demands.”  This was a list of 
concessions that Japan demanded from China, including expansion of Japanese control 
over areas of Shandong province, various mineral and railway rights, and an attempt to 
bar China from granting further rights to any other power than Japan.  These were 
eventually revised down to thirteen, and accepted by Yuan Shikai.  This ultimately 
sparked the anti-Imperialist May Fourth movement in China, along with a great deal of 
nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment in China.  The demands themselves gave Japan 
25 
 




 Japan's aggression in China aroused concern among other Western powers, but 
they limited their initial colonial efforts to Manchuria.  In 1932, Japan created a puppet 
state known as Manchukuo.  In 1937, they invaded China proper. This was the beginning 
of the Second Sino-Japanese war.  Japan was engaged in a large number of colonial 
conflicts in east and southeast Asia during this time period, but their invasion of China 
was the single largest and most costly operation. The Japanese invasions were brutal, 
inflicting terrible civilian casualties.  Most notable among the atrocities of Japanese 
troops was the Nanjing Massacre in which up to 300,000 civilians and prisoners of war 
were brutally killed. 
 
The Japanese Comfort Women scandal is another wartime atrocity that remains 
largely unresolved.  This is the documented use of native women in various countries as 
prostitutes for the Japanese Army.  The victims experienced terrible shame, and did not 
come forward until some decades later.  As well, the Japanese ran Unit 731, which was a 
biological and chemical weapons testing unit that performed human experimentation on 
an unknown number of victims.  Unit 731 was pardoned for its actions by the US 
Occupation regime in return for all of its research data.  This, too, is a lingering historical 
issue, particularly as leftover chemical munitions continue to cause occasional damage in 
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 Japan's postwar government formed around conservative, anti-Communist 
elements after the end of the Occupation.  This conservative takeover was sparked in part 
as a reaction against the Communist revolution in China, as the US immediately sought 
support from Japan as a bulwark against Communism in East Asia.  China's Communist 
regime was subject to western “containment” policy which excluded China from normal 




 In 1972, Japan resumed normal relations with China.  The 1972 Joint 
Communique included several points of agreement on normalization, including Japan's 
official recognition of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of 
China and the waiving of demands for war reparations by the Chinese government.
18
  
This opened the door to increased trade and further expansion of bilateral ties.  The 1970s 
also saw the origin of the East China Sea dispute, as initial survey work on those regions 
found evidence of oil and natural gas resources under the seabed.  
 The 1989 Tiananmen incident brought international censure down upon China 
from many countries, including Japan.  However, Japan was one of the first to end 
sanctions and resume normal trade.  Similarly, the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis caused a 
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brief reduction in trade relations, as well as political backlash. It was also during the 80s 
and 90s that history issues began to enter Sino-Japanese relations, starting with the initial 
textbook controversy in 1982.  Comfort Women began to come forward during this time 
period, and this and other wartime atrocities such as Unit 731 and the extent of the 
Nanjing Massacre were further verified with archival research. 
 In 1998, Jiang Zemin repeatedly demanded apologies from Japan during a state 
visit.  Japan had just apologized to South Korea, but were unwilling to also apologize to 
China.  These demands created a strong negative backlash in Japan and resulted in a 
cooling of relations.
19
  This was followed up three years later by Koizumi's promise to 
visit Yasukuni Shrine on August 15
th
.  This provoked a strong reaction from China and 
other neighboring countries, eventually causing Koizumi to visit the shrine on the 13
th
 of 
August as a compromise.  Koizumi's repeated Shrine visits and generally hawkish 
attitude created a rift in Sino-Japanese relations, perhaps the worst since normalization.  
 After Koizumi, prime ministers Abe and Fukuda took some steps to repair 
relations.  In 2009, the LDP was ousted in elections, and the DPJ was brought in, with 
their party platform that specifically included fostering strong relations with Asia.  
However, despite some attempts at mending fences, recent events such as the arrest of the 
fishing boat captain in September of this year have prevented strong reconciliation.  The 
future of relations is highly uncertain, with each nation having to balance what it can give 
up in the name of friendship. 
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Current Chinese Interests 
 In the Chinese case, the slow fading of Communist political practice has been 
matched by a reduction in the overt use of Communist ideology.  This began after the 
Cultural Revolution and continued in the Reform Era under Deng Xiaoping.  The party 
lost prestige from the Cultural Revolution.  Deng's reforms met with stiff resistance from 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) conservatives, and had frequent adverse effects in the 
lives of ordinary Chinese.  The 1989 Tiananmen incident further damaged the party's 
standing among the people, and worsened factional infighting within the Center. 
 The de-emphasis on class struggle ideology left a void in which elites had few 
levers to manipulate the minds of the populace.  Deng himself commented in 1994 that “I 
have told foreign guests that during the last 10 years our biggest mistake was made in the 
field of education, primarily in ideological and political education—not just of students 
but of the people in general.  We did not tell them enough enough about the need for hard 
struggle, about what China was like in the old days and what kind of a country it was to 
become.  That was a serious error on our part.”
20
 
 The decline of Communism within China has been a gradual process versus the 
violent overthrows that occurred in other former-Communist nations.  Many necessary 
changes have been made during this reform era, but has created a great deal of popular 
discontentment and disruption in the lives of citizens.  One of the key responses of the 
government to this disillusionment has been the creation of a nationalistic narrative to 
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unify and galvanize the populace.  The use of “patriotic education campaigns” and other 
domestic measures to create loyalty has had some negative side effects, particularly on 
relations with Japan.   
 The dissemination of nationalism in China has an official top-down origin.  The 
creation of a nationalist narrative began in the 1980s.  It became a mass movement in the 
1990s and found fertile ground among a populace eager for growth. Susan Shirk 
discusses the evolution of Chinese nationalism in China: Fragile Superpower.  Shirk finds 
that the growth of patriotic expression as a replacement for Communist ideology helped 
to soothe popular discontent, while occasionally directing popular outrage at external 
targets, particularly Japan.  The lives of regular Chinese have frequently been disrupted 
or adversely affected by reform measures, despite the explosive growth of China's 
economy. 
 This was coupled with insecurity on the part of the Chinese leadership, 
particularly in Jiang Zemin.  Jiang Zemin used Japan as a scapegoat more frequently than 
his predecessors, but Shirk posits that Japan has long been a special target of nationalist 
resentment.  There are several reasons for this, ranging from wartime offenses to the 
simple practical consideration that China cannot afford to offend the US too deeply, even 
if individual instances of anger or criticism erupt. 
 This nationalistic trend has created some hostile view of Sino-Japanese history 
among some Chinese citizens.  The narrative constructed to replace Communism was one 
of national struggle and victimization rather than class struggle, as before.  During Mao's 
30 
 
tenure, the Japanese citizens were victims like the Chinese, crushed by capitalist 
oppression.  More recent historical portrayals have focused on Japanese victimization of 
China as the final stroke in a century of humiliations at the hands of foreigners.  These 
portrayals were a part of enormous “patriotic education campaigns” that sought to 
increase the people's love and support for China, and their own struggle against the 
insults of the past.
21
  Though Chinese texts are careful to refer to “Japanese fascists” the 
distinction is not always so clear in the minds of the people, or the popular media.
22
 
 This narrative has been drawn backwards, as well.  The wako are interpreted as 
solely Japanese pirates despite evidence to the contrary.  The invasion of Korea by 
Hideyoshi becomes an early expression of a natural Japanese aggression and precursor to 
the modern era.  For Chinese nationalists, China has always been the center of culture in 
Asia.  China has always given gifts of culture and technological advancement to Japan, 
and been repaid with aggression.  Japan's current refusal to give China the apologies and 
reparations it demands are simply more offenses against China, while Japan's 
improvement of its defenses are signs of re-militarization for aggressive purposes.  For 
China, Japan took advantage of a single moment of national weakness, along with several 
other nations.  Within this narrative, it is stated that since China is growing strong again, 
Japan's behavior must improve.
23
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 The Chinese media has taken this narrative of Japan and run with it.  Stories about 
new outrages or scandals involving Japan are immediate opportunities for papers and 
websites to boost circulation.  Popular sentiments are expressed more rapidly than ever 
through the internet and cellphone networks.  Shirk even directly states that diplomats 
read the public internet debates, allowing it to set the agenda.
24
   
 A Chinese scholar named Ma Licheng wrote an article in 2002 which called for a 
more balanced approach towards Japan.  This created a firestorm of rebuttal at Ma, and 
also towards Japan itself.  In the article, Ma quoted Long Yongtu, a Chinese WTO 
negotiator.  Long stated that his greatest difficulty in negotiation came not from his 
foreign counterparts, but from domestic opinion that cursed him as a traitor for not 
immediately demanding that all of China's interests be met.
25
  The WTO is a frequent 
target for citizen action groups in many countries, but in the Chinese case it was 
specifically the feeling that Long was not getting a good enough deal and therefore 
failing China. 
 There have been several other incidents involving Japanese citizens or companies 
and Chinese nationalist forces.  The Chinese government was considering building a 
high-speed rail line from Beijing to Shanghai, a much-needed infrastructural 
improvement.  A Japanese company pulled ahead in the bidding and might have won the 
contract, until an enormous internet petition and firestorm of protest caused the planners 
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to defer the contract decision indefinitely.
26
  The Japanese UN Security Council bid 
created a protest petition that received twenty-two million signatures in China.  While it 
is extremely unlikely that China would have backed Japan in any case, the visceral 
strength of that response made it virtually impossible to make any supportive gesture. 
 This new patriotically-centered narrative comes to a China whose robust growth 
hides a brewing instability.  The leadership of China is all too aware of the precarious 
position they are in, and seek to create a cohesive nation without losing their position. 
This insecurity among leadership reaches citizens indirectly, and coupled with active 
patriotic education, it generates a strong national concern for China's prestige and 
strength in the world.  The lives of ordinary Chinese citizens are often placed at risk by 
policies of reform mandated by the government, so this narrative of overcoming national 
oppression is an excellent means of containing resentment of official disruption.  
 The use of “othering” is the creation of an out-group to glorify an in-group.  This 
is a tactic employed frequently in the development of nationalist myths, and can create 
strong feelings of solidarity among in-group members.
27
  With an in-group the size of 
China (or, well, the urban Han at least) one has quite a base from which to work, and 
quite a monster of a mob to tame when something angers national passions. 
 In creating these elite-lead nationalistic myths, leaders in China sought to unify 
and pacify the populace against a common enemy, a hostile world that had hurt China 
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before, and would do so again.  Their legitimacy was shifted from a “natural” class 
struggle, to defending China from these hostile forces.  This began with the Communists' 
successful defense against the Japanese in the Second Sino-Japanese War, and continues 
through the modern day.  The use of Japan as scapegoat came easily after the offenses of 
history.  In presenting a strong front against modern instances of historical amnesia, the 




 However, stoking nationalist fires and creating the expectation of a “strong” 
leadership front can very easily backfire.  China is painted into a corner in many of its 
negotiations with Japan.  In order to retain political legitimacy at home, elites must 
remain firm in the face of Japanese statements on historical issues, and even in other 
arenas such as trade matters or territorial disputes.  Failure to stand up to Japan can have 
negative impacts on a leader's career.  Making strong statements against Japan rarely 
causes a leader direct harm, however.  Japan can be quite useful for diverting attention 
away from difficult domestic issues—and China has a lot of difficult domestic issues.
29
 
 The anger of a mob is nothing to toy with, however.  Twice in the twentieth 
century, anti-Japanese protests have turned ultimately against the government.  The May 
Fourth Movement and the Xi'an Incident of 1936 both emerged out of popular discontent 
with foreign policy into full-blown political resistance.  Restraining modern incidents of 
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anti-Japanese expression requires the government to tread carefully in order to retain its 
perceived legitimacy and strength. Thus, one often sees calls for a “rational and lawful 
patriotism” while expressing sympathy for the causes that lead to protests, such as a very 
recent protest over Japan's handling of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute.
30
 
 China's Japan policy then is a combination of national interest and actively 
fostered nationalistic sentiment.  These nationalistic movements may be beyond the 
government's immediate control, despite the power of the state.  Chinese leadership has 
let some of their own political legitimacy hinge upon their opposition to Japan based on 
historical issues.  When Japan fails to concede to China's demands, they are committing 
yet another offense against China. For diplomats trying to negotiate, there is little room to 
give, creating an environment that leaves few options for successful negotiation. 
 Putnam argued that having domestic limitations on one's negotiating space 
allowed for better results, in order to have a successful negotiation of some kind.  
However, the corollary to that is that too many domestic constraints create an inoperable 
negotiating space, causing a failure to reach any agreement at all.  China's domestic 
constraints when it comes to Japan are fierce. 
The Japanese Perspective 
 Japan likewise faces some popular resistance to issues with China, most notably 
the issue of war apologies.  The perception of most Japanese is that Japan has apologized 
enough and has been an exemplary international citizen for decades.  Some ultra-
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nationalist elements of Japanese society deny many of the history issues entirely.  These 
heavily nationalist blocs were a very loyal component of the LDP's support which the 
party could not easily afford to alienate.  Negotiating executives are not unitary actors, 
but they do retain their own interests.  One of these interests is keeping their domestic 
support coalition intact through the course of negotiations.
31
 
 This primarily impacts issues related to wartime history, and the wartime history 
issues are major points of contention with China.  However, these Japanese nationalists 
share some characteristics with their Chinese brethren in not wanting Japan to lose 
territory or prestige, perhaps to China in particular.  There is a feeling among even some 
moderate Japanese that China is using its historical demands to try and browbeat 
concessions from Japan as well, regardless of any validity of claims. 
 Japan tends to frame these encounters with an arrogant sort of impatience with 
Chinese demands.  Japan has been facing a slow economic decline.  China, meanwhile, 
continues on a path of enormous growth.  The attitude of the Japanese negotiators under 
the LDP was product of several factors.  They had to cater to the domestic coalition that 
refused to yield on important points of history, as well as a public sentiment that felt such 
matters were settled.  There was also the feeling that continued Chinese insistence upon 
those matters was needless aggravation. 
 Japan's academic historical community is more robust and open than China's, and 
there is very serious argument over the interpretation of Japan's past.  The Imperial 
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legacy was one of immense destruction, but there are still factions within Japan that 
would see that war as a “liberation” of nations colonized or threatened by Europeans.  
Much of the “history offense” from Japan comes from this faction, where comments from 
nationalists on history are taken as representative.  When China then demands that these 
statements or books be censored, Japan faces the internal resistance of the factions in 
question, and the intrusion of a foreign group within their domestic affairs.  Japanese 
citizens are not eager to lose freedom of speech to China's demands. 
 There is a current within Japan's nationalist movements to make Japan a “normal 
nation,” a term that primarily refers to repealing Article 9 and allowing for regular 
deployment of Japanese troops for necessary operations.  In this way, Japan would not be 
dependent upon US protection, but would be an equal power.  This group favors the use 
of Japanese forces for peacekeeping operations, rather than simply refueling missions or 
similarly non-violent endeavors.
32
  China tends to see these movements and 
improvements to Japan's Self-Defense Forces as threatening signs of re-militarization.  
 Objections by the Japanese public to the deployment of the SDF in support of 
such missions remains incredibly high.  Koizumi's decision to dispatch Japanese troops to 
the Gulf was opposed by tho-thirds of citizens.
33
  The Japanese public at large remains 
fairly committed to pacifist principles, and is unwilling to expand Japan's worldwide 
military role.  This is a sharp contrast to how the Japanese people are portrayed within 
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China.  Meanwhile, Chinese arms buildup is threatening to Japan,  though China will not 
generally acknowledge this.   
 Unfortunately, anytime the Japanese update SDF systems, China reacts as though 
they were gearing for conquest.  Japan feels threatened by China's growing regional and 
military power, and has reluctantly allowed itself a more realist role in foreign affairs.  
When Japan's requests for greater military transparency from China are denied, domestic 
forces question the utility of ODA to China.
34
 
 There is a feeling within Japan that despite its current wealth, it remains a 
struggling and insecure nation.  China's constant demands for apology have created a 
resistance among Japanese leadership to avoid seeming weak.  This is the case with 
Koizumi, defiantly visiting the Yasukuni Shrine while in office.
35
  Despite the tough-guy 
posturing of elites, economic activities between the two countries continue to boom.  
Below the national level, making ties city-to-city or prefecture-to-prefecture remains 
quite common, though Japan's citizenry have felt less affinity and less security with their 
Chinese neighbors as time has gone by. 
 Japan's sense of insecurity is transmitted variously to the public, and their affinity 
for China is negatively affected by Chinese statements to and about Japan.  This erosion 
of affinity by Japanese citizens for China coincides with various historical scandals such 
as Tiananmen and the Taiwan Crisis of 1996. It is a worrisome trend, one that has shown 
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little reversal since Koizumi's leaving office in 2006. 
  Though the recently-elected DPJ is not as beholden to nationalistic interests as 
the LDP was, they still must contend with their own domestic crisis and the strong 
Chinese diplomatic front that demands much and concedes little. Given the ongoing 
economic struggles, Japan has many reasons to look inwards. 
 
 Japan has a sense of its own national superiority, tarnished and faded by time.  It 
is not unusual for nations to carry such feelings. When dealing with China, there is a 
lingering sense of victory, of Japan's greater status.  China now contests this  identity, and 
 
Illustration 1: Japanese Affinity for China 
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acts threatening with their enormous military buildup and vociferous demands.  The 
Japanese public still abhors the use of the military for combat missions, and cannot 
understand China's assertions of violence. Likewise, some Japanese express disdain at the 
apparent hypocrisy of a nation as repressive as China demanding apologies for WWII-era 
rights abuses that occurred before anyone currently involved in the debate was born. 
 Japan's security is threatened by a resurgent China, not just in simple military 
terms, but as a regional hegemon.  Working with these issues separately is difficult, but 
maintaining a peaceful status quo is of utmost importance to the region, and to Japan 
itself.  However, a nation may not appear too weak, and so saber rattling must be 
answered with a strong statement in kind.  Japan's economic interests are deeply tied into 
China, but Japan cannot afford to cede important physical resources or hemorrhage 
international prestige in order to keep those same ties.  
  Japan's nationalists can not be  completely ignored even by the DPJ, and many 
moderate Japanese share some limited sympathy for certain nationalist positions, such as 
keeping control of at least part of the East China Sea.  Even while trying to turn towards 
China in policy, the recent trawler incident destroyed any positive impact that Kan was 
trying to make.  In this situation where a prime minister must avoid looking weak to 
avoid a stern domestic backlash, and an opponent in much the same straits, it can be 
difficult to find a shared path. 
 Shared History, Shared Aggravation 
 Japan and China see each other as rivals more than allies in these modern times. 
40 
 
This is a direct result of the Second Sino-Japanese War.  That conflict may be seventy 
years over, but the scars it wrought are slow to heal.  As well, China's emerging 
nationalism wishes to reclaim China's central place in East Asia.  Japan's national pride 
likewise does not wish to lose the position it has gained.  The situation is most likely to 
be resolved peacefully in the end, but the argument that ensues is long and rocky.  
Neither side is planning on military adventurism against the other.  They are both, 
however, planning to try and get as much undersea national gas as they can.  Both are 
increasing military power for their own security with no intention to deploy it—a 
situation that can look frightening without context.  They both have some very different 














Chapter 3:  East China Sea and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
 The East China Sea dispute is over the maritime borders of a shallow sea that lies 
between China and Japan.  The division of the East China Sea was not of any particular 
importance to either country until survey data in 1968 suggested the presence of 
extensive seabed natural gas and oil resources.  The presence of these resources has 
created a situation in which conflicting principles of sea law are utilized by both nations 
to justify their claims.   
 Further complicating the border division are some islands, called Diaoyu in China 
and Senkaku in Japan.  These islands are also claimed by both nations, in a dispute that 
actually goes back to the 19
th
 century and the first Sino-Japanese war.  The East China 
Sea contains important resources that both nations need to fuel their hungry economies.  
The islands are important territorial symbols, and may directly affect the borders drawn 
in the East China Sea.  The islands are also a very powerful interest of nationalist groups 
in both China and Japan, and several times in recent history the actions of individual 
citizens upon the islands have created international incidents. 
 The historical background of this dispute informs legal strategies utilized by both 
nations to justify their claims over both the Sea and the islands.  The validity of both 
claims will be examined with that historical context in mind, as well as via international 
law principles. Neither nation is willing to submit their arguments to international 
arbitration, so the legal arguments are largely a justification for national policy choices. 
 In addition to legal principles, there are Level II nationalist movements afoot.  
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Both China and Japan make territorial claims on the East China Sea and the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.  Irredentist citizen groups at Level II have latched onto the 
widest possible version of these claims, and pressure their governments to maintain these 
positions.  Given the mineral resources involved, China and Japan have little reason to 
settle for less than they can legally justify at Level I.  The relatively small area 
(particularly of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands) has frequently allowed citizens to try and 
press their government's claims upon the islands through small group or even individual 
action.  Level II Groups from both nations claim historical precedence over the other 
nation, as well as legal justification. 
 The flow of diplomatic and legal arguments to nationalist movements and back 
again is not always smooth, but the interactions of opinionated citizens and governments 
with interests to protect have a powerful impact on how this dispute has played out over 
time. 
A Simple, Shallow Sea 
 The East China Sea is a shallow basin sea lying between China and Japan.  Its 
maximum depth is less than 200m with the exception of the Okinawa Trough, which 
reaches depths of up to 3,000m.  Historically, it has given rise to few direct conflicts.  




 centuries sailed on its waters, but they were 
suppressed in time, and were never large enough to create a war over their presence.   
 The 1982 Third Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention grants all nations 12 nautical 




also may apply to ships with dangerous cargoes (such as single-hulled oil tankers) and 
other substances that the EEZ-holding nation wishes to control.  Nations reserve the right 
to board and inspect merchant shipping that passes through their EEZ. 
 In the case of the East China Sea, the 200-mile principle must be compromised 
because the Sea itself is less than 400 nautical miles wide at its widest point.  This 
requires a boundary to be drawn according to separate sea law principles.  In cases where 
there is an EEZ overlap due to facing coastlines, the individual nations must delineate 
their shared EEZ.
36
   
 The sea law principles invoked by both nations to assert their boundary claims are 
conflicting.  China prefers a “continental shelf” interpretation.  This interpretation defines 
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Illustration 2:Image source 
<http://www.japanprobe.com/2007/10/29/chinese-
activists-try-to-invade-senkaku-islands/> 20 Aug 2010 
(EEZ) that extends beyond that.  
 The EEZ is not identical to a nation's 
territorial waters in that ships from 
other nations may enter it without 
permission, but nations have varying 
policies on what notification they 
receive, and many forbid certain 
cargoes from entering. This is 
primarily related to contraband, but  
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a nation's EEZ as following the natural extension of the continental shelf. The continental 
shelf from China extends through ninety percent of the disputed area.   The Okinawa 
Trough runs along part of the East China seabed, though it does not follow Japan's 
coastline closely.  Under the “continental shelf” principle, China claims that the Okinawa 
Trough is proof of a fundamental discontinuity, that is to say a geographical separation of 
its continental shelf from Japan's, and justifies its EEZ claims on this basis.
37
 
 This principle would allow China an EEZ that encloses ninety percent of the East 
China Sea and runs fairly closely to Japan's coastline, halting only at the Okinawa 
Trough.  The continental shelf interpretation allows a 350-mile limit for “natural 
prolongation” beyond coastal boundaries.  It would grant China sovereignty over all the 
disputed mineral resources, and unquestioned navigational primacy through the region, as 
shown in Illustration 1 above.   
 Japan utilizes an equally applicable principle of the LOS.  Article 74 requires 
states to negotiate on the basis of international law to reach an equitable solution to 
territorial disputes.  In the absence of mutual agreement, Japan made a unilateral 
designation of a median line in 1996, when they declared their EEZ.  China rejects this 
median line on the grounds that it veers into Chinese territory, and also marks the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands as Japanese territory.    
 While these disputes over boundaries draw official diplomatic protests between 
China and Japan, they do not tend to generate the kinds of popular demonstrations that 
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the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute does.  For instance, when trade minister Shoichi 
Nakagawa compared China's Chunxiao field to a “sucking straw” that would absorb 
Japanese resources underground, he certainly offended some Chinese sensibilities.
38
  
However, there was nothing like the demonstrations that have greeted even casual 
statements about the islands dispute.  Several rounds of talks have gone by without any 
useful consensus on the boundary issues themselves.  
 These two positions are wholly incompatible from a legal standpoint.  One 
principle has to take precedence over the other.  However, neither nation has been willing 
to submit their case to the International Court of Justice or any other entity to resolve the 
dispute, possibly out of a mistrust of third-party organizations, and also a fear of loss of 
the case.  There is more at stake than that, however.  Neither nation's leadership can 
afford to look weak in the area of losing territory—not in the East China Sea, or 
anywhere else.  Nationalists in China and Japan both demand the largest possible claim 
be enforced, and they are very vocal with these positions.  In addition to the fear of public 
reprisal, there are important strategic resources to consider in making any agreement with 
regards to the East China Sea.  
Islands of No Man 
 The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands make few appearances in history prior to the origins 
of the current dispute in the 1970s.  The islands are uninhabited and incapable of 
supporting either extended settlements or significant economic activity.  They fall almost 
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perfectly equidistantly between the Sakishima islands and Taiwan.  The islands were first 
discovered by the Ming Chinese, and given official names in 1403.  Since that time they 
have been listed in Ming and Qing archival maps as part of China's coastal defenses, and 
referenced as navigational aids.  This original ownership is the basis of China's primary 
territorial claim to the islands.
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 Japan claims that a Japanese businessman found the islands in 1884 as terra 
nullius or unclaimed land, and that Japan was the first to establish effective 
administration over the area.  They state that the Okinawa prefectural government made 
several surveys of the islands and found no evidence of habitation or ownership by any 
nation, nor did they receive any protest from the Chinese government.  The formal 
annexation occurred in 1895 when Japan erected territorial markers on the islands.
40
 
 Japan uses “discovery” theory or the assertion of having found the islands in an 
unclaimed state without evidence of Chinese (or any other) administration in order to 
back their territorial claims.  This is a valid principle in international law, though the 
assertion of terra nullius may not be valid due to China's existing records of the islands' 
ownership.  Terra nullius requires a territory to have never been claimed, or for a state to 
have intentionally abandoned administration of a territory.  Acquisition by prescription, 
meanwhile, is the creation of effective control over a territory that was not being 
administered but had not been abandoned.  Prescription requires a longer period of 
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effective occupation, and a lack of protest by the original owner.
41
  China did not make 
any protests over the administration of the islands from at least 1895 until the 1970s. 
 China has claimed since the 1970s that the islands were ceded to Japan as part of 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended the first Sino-Japanese War.  However, the treaty 
lists the territories of Fengtien (now Liaoning) province in China, Taiwan and its 
associated islands, and the Pescadores or Penghu islands as the territories ceded, but not 
the Diaoyu islands.  The Penghu islands are much closer to Taiwan than the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku chain, and are also traditionally administered as a part of Taiwan.  It is 
puzzling that Japan would specify the Penghu separately, but not the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands if the treaty covered those as well.
42
  It may be that China intends the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands to be counted among the “associated islands” of Taiwan, but the 
treaty does not truly seem to address these islands as a part of its territorial disposition.  It 
seems likely that Japan simply felt confident in avoiding protest from China in timing 
their incorporation of the Diaoyu/Senkaku chain some months after the end of the first 
Sino-Japanese War, in 1895. 
 The Chinese claim from the Treaty of Shimonoseki follows then that the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands would have reverted back to Chinese administration along with 
Taiwan, Manchuria, and other territories taken during Japanese Imperial conquest.  The 
Taiwanese likewise make the same claim, though they are not party to the LOS or any of 
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the other treaties involved. 
 China's basic claim is ancient sovereignty, and this is their strongest claim upon 
the islands. The justification through the Treaty of Shimonoseki did not arise until the 
1970s when China began wanting the islands back, along with a sizeable chunk of the 
East China Sea.   As this claim is fairly easily debunked, I feel that China is better off 
going with their claim of original administration.    That is to say, China's historical 
records support their claim, and Japan's taking of the islands was aggressive, if not illegal 
in any strict sense. 
 The United States has also been involved in the disposition of the islands' 
sovereignty, though somewhat backhandedly.  The Taiwanese attempted to claim the 
Ryukyu islands as a part of the territories to be reverted after WWII, but US was having 
none of that.  The Ryukyu islands were far too strategic to US interests in the Pacific, 
though they also decided against simple annexation from Japan.  The annexation would 
have proven costly, and the Ryukyu islands were subject to a strong Japanese claim as 
well as having a cultural connection with the Japanese state.  This resulted in the US 
trusteeship of the Ryukyu islands, and included the Diaoyu/Senkaku chain as a part of 
that administration.   
 This administration included paying the descendant of the Japanese “discoverer” a 
yearly rent for the use of the islands as a shooting ground for the US Navy.  In 1971, The 
Ryukyu reversion treaty explicitly returned the islands to Japan.
43
  If the islands are in 
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fact legitimately Chinese territory, the US cannot grant Japan sovereignty over them.  
However, the US acknowledgment of the Japanese claim strengthened the Japanese 
confidence in their own claim, and their willingness to assert this claim against possible 
Chinese aggression towards the islands. 
 The US-Japan Security Treaty also explicitly covered the islands until very 
recently.  The Obama administration removed explicit reference to the islands in the 
Security Treaty, though they did not explicitly exclude the islands either.
44
  The indirect 
omission was minor, stating that the treaty applied to territories under Japanese 
administration without mentioning the islands by name.  This is a contrast to the position 
of previous US administrations, which directly invoked the islands.  This maneuver 
seemed to be intended to soothe Beijing during the US financial crisis, and sent jitters 
through Tokyo.  It seems likely that the US would still honor the treaty if military action 
were called for in the islands, but thankfully any such action has been a remote 
possibility. 
 The islands themselves are actually quite dismal little dots in the ocean.  Their 
importance lies in whether or not they have a continental shelf and thus generate an EEZ 
for the controlling nation.  China holds that the chain does not qualify for the status of 
“islands” under international law, and thus have no continental shelf, and therefore do not 
generate an EEZ.  Instead, China utilizes the natural prolongation principle mentioned 
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previously to lay claim to the majority of the seabed and its resources.   
 Japan defines the Diaoyu/Senkaku features as islands, and thus claims that they 
have continental shelf and generate an EEZ.  If the features are islands, they generate an 
EEZ, and the maritime borders of the East China Sea would be drastically altered.  
Article 121 of the LOS stipulates that “Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or 
economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”  
Japan claims that the islands are habitable, though no Japanese has attempted to live there 




  Given the paucity of resources on the 
islands, this claim seems difficult to accept as valid. 
 If the features are not islands, then it makes little sense for China to worry about 
them so, except to keep them out of Japanese hands.  The islands have become symbols 
of national pride, however, in both nations.  Japanese and Chinese nationalists protest in 
the streets over handling of incidents in the waters surrounding the islands.  Irredentist 
groups have long tried to use the islands as levers to compel their own governments to 
protect national territorial interests as they perceive them.   
Nationalism and Development 
 All this legal wrangling surrounding these tiny islands ultimately has to do with 
whether or not they can generate an EEZ into the East China Sea, particularly over 
contested oil and gas fields.  This would grant a controlling interest over much of the sea 
as well, with valuable fishing rights and sea lane access.  These are important national 
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interests, but the symbolic power of the islands lies more in their status as physical 
territory, however minor.  Nationalist groups in China and Japan see the islands as 
powerful markers of national pride, and vigorously protest any possibility of their loss to 
a rival nation. 
 Japanese nationalist groups tend to whitewash the worst offenses of Japan's 
wartime history, and paint the Imperial military past as one of liberation for nations of 
East and Southeast Asia from western Imperialism.  These groups tend to fall into the 
category that wants Japan to return to being a “normal nation,” or revising the Japanese 
constitution to revoke Article 9 and permit Japan to organize its own defense through a 
regular military force.   
 Beyond this, however, many are distrustful of the US-Japan Security Alliance, 
and feel that US protection of Japanese interests is unreliable at best, and destructive to 
Japanese prestige at worst.  These groups want Japan to be strong enough to stand up to 
China and not need to rely on the US for its security.  They seek to protect what they 
perceive as Japan's international prestige and territory.
46
 
 The position of these groups is that the median line division of the East China Sea 
is the only valid division, and they see China's use of the natural prolongation principle as 
a sea access denial to Japan, as well as a resource grab.  They also see Japan's acquisition 
of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands as completely legal, particularly since China did not 
protest Japan's administration of the islands for seventy years.  They push the Japanese 
                                                 
46
 Samuels, Richard J.  Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia.  Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press.  2007. 
52 
 
government to prosecute Chinese or Taiwanese protesters that   enter the islands' 
territorial waters, and organize protests in Tokyo whenever China takes an action they see 
as compromising Japanese interests.  
 Chinese nationalism has a wider popular base than the Japanese version 
mentioned above, as the elite dissemination of a patriotic narrative of victimization has 
instilled a love of country, and a deep resentment of injuries from the past.  The 
blossoming of the internet in China has given many citizens a new medium for the 
discussion of public affairs, though the state still monitors online interactions, and 
criticism is met with reprisal.   
 One area in which citizens are fairly free to speak their minds is in criticizing 
Japan, however, and even in criticizing the government for not taking enough action to 
protect China from perceived Japanese rapaciousness.  The harping on Japanese 
victimization of China has left many Chinese feeling that Japan is in fact indebted to 
China for resources stolen and wrongs committed.  This has created an aggrieved sense 
of entitlement in the general public towards Japan, and created the attitude that when 




 The Chinese nationalist position is that the Japanese should yield the full 
continental shelf according to the natural prolongation principle, which is both legal and 
moral.  China needs these energy resources for its security.  In addition, the 
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Diaoyu/Senkaku islands were illegally stolen by the Japanese Fascists and must be 
returned to China as a redress of a historical wrong.  Anytime Japan makes statements of 
its claim on the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, protests erupt in Chinese cities.  These are often 
non-violent, but they occur fairly frequently. 
 These nationalists in both nations have taken individual steps to try and force their 
governments to press these claims.  Level II interests frequently lobby their governments 
in order to try and influence international agreements that might affect their interests, but 
in the case of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, pursuing these interests often takes the form of 
visiting the islands directly.  This has the effect of forcing a response from their native 
government, but also forces a (negative) response from the opposing government in the 
dispute, creating a Level I incident. 
 1978 was the first major incident, when a Japanese nationalist group landed on the 
largest of the islands and constructed a lighthouse.  They were there to protest the China-
Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty, a post-normalization agreement on certain navigation 
and fishery rights, a dedication to peaceful coexistence, and affirmation of the One-China 
principle.  The nationalists chose the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands to make their claim 
because China and Japan had both asserted sovereignty over the islands in the years 
leading up to the Peace and Friendship Treaty.  
 The nationalists were opposed to normalization with China, and also wished to 
compel the insertion of an “anti-hegemony” clause aimed at gaining some commitment 
from China against Soviet Russia.  While they were unsuccessful in derailing 
54 
 
negotiations entirely, the anti-hegemony clause was included, and their exploits received 
much press.  They departed the islands when they spotted armed “fishing junks” circling 
the area.
48
   
 This is the first incident in which individual nationalists used the islands to gain 
the attention of and try to compel policy direction via the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.  
China, Japan, and Taiwan had all made claims upon the islands since the 1968 survey 
that revealed the East China seabed resources.  For these nationalists, asserting Japanese 
interests through the islands allowed them to send a clear message, and their government 
did not ignore it—the treaty received an additional clause—even if they did not achieve 
all of their policy goals.   
 Though these nationalists were taking a Level II action in trying to lobby the 
Japanese government through their efforts, they also affected Level I negotiations directly 
through their presence on the islands.  This has been a frequent pattern of events related 
to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, in which Level II constituencies end up speaking directly 
to Level I concerns without the intermediary of a leader in formal negotiations.  The 
islands are remote, but not so far out that they are not reachable by determined citizens 
with a message to deliver. 
 In 1990, another Japanese nationalist group attempted to repair the 1978 
lighthouse, and the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency reported that they were going to 
recognize it as an official navigation marker.  The Chinese Foreign Ministry protested 
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that this would be a violation of China's sovereignty.  The Japanese Maritime Safety 
Agency also repelled a boat of Taiwanese activists, which resulted in more protests from 
both the PRC and Taiwan.   
 The nationalists continued to press for recognition of their lighthouse as an 
official marker, but Japan elected to shelve the issue while still maintaining their claim, 
and stated they would move cautiously on recognition.
49
  There is no evidence that the 
group was acting in any collusion with the government in their repair attempt, so perhaps 
the Maritime Safety Agency was simply taking advantage of the opportunity provided 
without full consideration to international implications.  Once committed, the Japanese 
government could not simply back down to protest, and had to maintain its claim, even 
though the lighthouse remains unrecognized as a marker. 
 1996 saw one of the worst incidents of the dispute, undoubtedly influenced by 
tensions over Taiwan in the same year.  This incident included the only fatality to occur 
in relation to the island dispute.  Once again a Japanese nationalist group landed on the 
islands and attempted to construct another lighthouse.  This created an enormous patriotic 
response from even non-mainland Chinese, including a 20,000 person march in San 
Francisco.  A boatload of Hong Kong protesters was blocked by Japanese Coast Guard 
ships.  One of the protesters attempted to swim to shore and drowned in the process.  The 
governments, Japan and China both, tried to downplay the territorial issues, however.  
This was likely due to attempts to recover from the recent Taiwan Straits crisis, as well as 
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 anniversary of the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War.
50
 
 The Japanese nationalists were following in the footsteps of their forebears in 
attempting to press Japanese interests through the medium of the islands, though their 
specific policy goals are unclear outside of “assert Japanese sovereignty.”  1996 was the 
year in which Japan declared its EEZ in the East China Sea, in addition to the larger 
Taiwan Straits crisis.   
 The response protests from China and Taiwan were likewise motivated by a 
patriotic desire to defend national territory.  These activists managed to create an 
international incident that required their governments to respond.  This caused problems 
for their administrations, but it is difficult for a government to chastise its citizens for 
trying to defend their own national territory. 
 Since Japan continues to administer the islands, the Japanese Coast Guard 
continues to occasionally expel fishing vessels from contested waters.  In 2004, one 
group of Chinese protesters managed to land on the islands, the first landing since 1996, 
but were simply deported.  Japanese nationalists made calls for their arrest and 
prosecution for illegal trespassing, but the Japanese government elected to smooth 
relations and returned them.
51
  
 Most recently, in September of 2010, a Chinese fishing trawler collided with two 
Japanese Coast Guard boats after refusing orders to leave contested waters around the 
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islands.  The captain and crew were arrested and the boat was impounded.  The violence 
of this incident did not allow for a simple deportation as with the 2004 group, but the 
arrest generated immediate protest from the Chinese government and organized 
demonstrations by citizens within China.  Japanese activists called for the vigorous 
prosecution of the skipper and crew.  The Japanese government publicly mulled this 
option over, but elected to release first the crew and boat, then the trawler itself, in order 
to prevent further deterioration of relations. 
 The captain of the trawler, one Zhao Qixiong, is quoted as saying that the islands 
belong to China, and he is not afraid of the Japanese government.
52
  He returned home 
September 28
th
 to a hero's welcome.  Zhao's defiance of Japanese administration and 
willingness (along with his crew) to risk arrest bespeaks the extent of Chinese 
nationalism among the general public.  A Coast Guard film of the incident of the arrest 
reportedly shows the trawler ramming two Coast Guard boats before attempting escape.
53
 
 As a fisherman, he has a vested interest in the broadest possible fishing rights 
being available.  However, such aggressive action towards Japanese authorities is 
troubling. The actions of this single boat have managed to create an enormous diplomatic 
row between China and Japan, as well as large protests in both nations.  It is unclear that 
Zhao or his crew had any policy goal in their choice of actions, but the expressed 
nationalism of the skipper at least reveals personal motivation.  The effect on the 
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international relations of both governments has been enormous, resulting in the 
cancellation of high-level meetings at other conferences.   
 The wake of the trawler row is ongoing, and planned talks over development of 
the East China Sea were among those delayed.  Thus far the two nations have not been 
able to reach any compromise on the issue of specific EEZ boundaries.  China began 
surveying and drilling work on an oil field called Chunxiao which straddles the Japanese-
drawn median line, in 2003.  This drew immediate protest from Japan, which 
subsequently authorized drilling in an adjacent field in 2005, on its side of the median 
line.   
 The two fields have gone through various stages of production, though the actual 
status of the fields is unverified.  Japan recently launched a seismic survey ship which 
might confirm drilling at the Chinese site.
54
  In 2008, a “principled consensus” was 
reached to allow for joint development of a natural gas field, without any territorial 
concessions from either side.  As recently as this year, that development plan has yet to 
be finalized.
55
   
 The East China Sea EEZ does not create the same kinds of nationalistic protests 
as the islands dispute, but the islands would not be so important if they could not affect 
the disposition of the East China Sea.  The actions of small groups of nationalists upon 
the islands have frequently disrupted work towards resolution of the larger East China 
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The People and Protest 
  Individual protesters reaching the islands brings the island dispute to the forefront 
as nations are tasked with defending their citizenry from foreign powers.  If they punish 
the individuals involved, they are tacitly ceding to other nations' claims.  Citizens wishing 
to press their nation's claim have the ability then, to force their government into a 
response that it may not desire.   The negotiations at Level I are at times held hostage to 
the desires of domestic constituents such as Zhao Qixiong, a simple fishing captain.  
Greater leadership at the domestic level is necessary to preemptively persuade citizens 
against taking such actions, at least in the absence of a resolution of the dispute itself.  
 Unfortunately, the ability of nationalists to set the agenda for the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands sometimes seems to be aided or at least tacitly tolerated by national authorities.  
In the 1996 incident, Japanese protester boats were permitted to pass by Maritime Safety 
Agency patrols, but were later portrayed by the Foreign Ministry as private individuals 
acting on their own.  Likewise, in 2003, Hong Kong protesters who were blocked from 
reaching the islands returned to a celebration organized by local officials.
56
 
 The ongoing recent demonstrations in China against the Japanese handling of the 
trawler incident has been allowed to continue without police interference, except in 
instances when they turned violent.  Even when the protesters vandalized Japanese-held 
properties, riot police halted only those instance of violence, without halting the protests 
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as a whole.  Officials called for calm without enforcing it.
57
  For China, a country which 
keeps a tight control on public order, the message seemed to be clear.  Protest against 
Japan over the islands dispute was acceptable, and the interest of citizens in protecting 
the island claim was shared by the state.   
 Some of this governmental support during island incidents is clearly to placate or 
win approval from nationalist elements.  Celebrating the return of protesters or “falsely 
arrested citizens” is a way to win approval from those who support those causes.  Doing 
so creates less international outcry than bold statements by officials or official actions by 
naval vessels.   
 The rewarding of citizens for invading the islands is done by local governments, 
which have a great deal to gain from enhancing their immediate popularity.  The lack of 
punishment for these same citizens or for violent protesters in China, is a means for the 
national government to support its patriotic narrative and support its legitimacy with the 
public.  While overt acts of aggression by government agents could easily spiral out of 
control, citizens acting on their own is unlikely to create more than an incident.  The 
Chinese government gains from citizens directing their anger outwards, away from its 
domestic policies, and so relatively controlled protests against Japan are unlikely to be 
met with any kind of serious crackdown response. 
 Both nations (and Taiwan) seem to have evaluated the possibility of direct 
military seizure of the islands and decided against it.  Neither nation has sufficient 
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military supremacy over the other to ensure victory, and the loss of economic ties would 
be vastly more costly than the military action itself.  As well, it is difficult to predict how 
the situation would proceed with Japan's security alliance to the US.  The situation could 
rapidly spiral out of control, creating a regional arms race at the very least.
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 Chien-Peng Chung recently wrote a two-level analysis of China's island disputes.  
In this writing, he contradicted Thomas Schelling's finding that “having one's hands tied” 
could be advantageous.  That is to say, having obstructive domestic groups that make 
agreement more difficult can perversely allow a negotiator to seek a more advantageous 
outcome by risking no-agreement by citing the complete inability to reach domestic 
ratification with the inclusion of certain points.  An example would be a US negotiator in 
a trade discussion presented with an agreement that includes limitations on American 
beef exports.  This would be very unpopular with American beef producers, and they 
have a strong political lobby which could prevent ratification of the agreement with that 
clause.  So, the negotiator will use the threat of failure of the agreement to have it 
removed, or otherwise pursue more favorable terms in the negotiation. 
 However, Chung asserts that in the case of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, the 
domestic preferences are for positions that are completely incompatible—the legal 
justifications of ownership for the islands are incompatible, and the domestic emphasis 
placed on ownership of the islands creates no compatible win-set.  There are no points on 
which negotiators can compromise, no possibility of dual administration or division of 
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the area.  This incompatibility is further complicated by the modern transparency of 
negotiations, in which negotiators are subject to public scrutiny during the diplomatic 
process.  The appearance of compromise on these island issues is too politically sensitive 




 I would argue that this applies to discussions of the East China Sea dispute as 
well, though such negotiations do not create as much public response as the island 
incidents do.  Thusly there is the current “principled agreement” in place since 2008, 
which explicitly does not address issues of territorial claim while still attempting to 
finally tap into some of the resources under the seabed. 
 Two-level framework also acknowledges that when an agreement would 
compromise the interests of a small group within a nation but spread its benefits out over 
the nation as a whole, the small group will organize and lobby heavily to protect their 
interests.  In the case of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, fishermens’ groups are strongly 
impacted by the threat of losing rights in areas around the islands.  While there is no 
current agreement governing the waters around the islands, actions of fishermen such as 
Zhao Qixiong can be interpreted as part of this protection of interests.  The Japanese 
Coast Guard has removed Taiwanese fishing vessels on several occasions, though 
without the creation of international incidents.
60
  If the islands were to fall definitively 
into the hands of one nation or the other, the rights of fishermen from other nations could 
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Interests and Outcomes 
 China is a rapidly growing nation, and they have struggled to meet all of their 
energy needs even after the end of Containment.  The world’s petrochemical resources 
are frequently already tied up in longstanding agreements between nations other than 
China, and the concern of energy security is very real to a nation that was excluded from 
the mainstream of world economic affairs in living memory.  The oil and gas fields of the 
East China Sea are quite important to the Chinese government as a strategic resource as a 
result of this.  The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are important for how they might shape the 
East China Sea’s maritime borders, but they have gained great status as national symbols 
of China’s struggle among the general public. 
China’s territorial integrity is a matter of great interest to Chinese nationalists, and 
irredentist claims of these groups include areas like Tibet as part of China’s ancient, 
sacred territory.  This same principle is applied to island disputes in which China is 
involved, even though the land areas involved are generally quite small.  The historical 
narrative of victimization utilized in education and within portions of the media creates a 
sense of rivalry with Japan.  This rivalry blossoms into deep popular resentment of 
Japanese refusals of Chinese claims on the East China Sea, and of the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands in particular.  The Chinese government has crafted an image for itself as the 
righteous defender of the Chinese people from outside threats that previously damaged 
the nation, and the worst of these threats was Japan.   For the government to fail to 
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aggressively pursue its claims in the East China Sea dispute would betray this narrative in 
popular consciousness. 
Two-level theory predicts that a non-democratic regime will have an easier time 
presenting and enforcing an agreement since it can deny opposing interests the ability to 
organize against the adoption process.  However, this has proven not to be the case with 
regards to issues involving Japan.  The administration has permitted relatively free 
criticism of Japan where it might have clamped down on stories about the US in order to 
avoid offending US sensibilities too much.
61
  Public opinion has become a powerful force 
in Chinese politics, and Japan is one of the areas of strongest feeling.   
Japan's government is more democratic, though the DPJ has shown little 
inclination to alter the policies set by the LDP.  Indeed, during the recent fracas over the 
islands, Tokyo refused an offer of joint development from Beijing, stating that since the 
islands were Japanese territory, there was no reason for joint development.
62
  Japan has 
seen its fortunes wane in the last two decades, with a struggling economy that has 
required a number of painful reforms.  While Japan has struggled to prop itself up, China 
has risen, phoenix-like, and continues to grow explosively.  Japan is faced with the nerve-
wracking prospect of enormous Chinese regional power against which it must balance 
itself, with only the US-Japan Security Alliance at its back.  Likewise, Japan has even 
fewer native energy reserves than China, and has been negatively affected by energy 
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embargoes in the past, so the East China Sea resources are a tempting security investment 
as well as valuable resource.   
The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands likewise represent sea territories that Japan considers 
important.  They are also an issue of dominance between Japan and China, and for Japan 
to simply give up the islands or moderate its claims (such as accepting a designation that 
the islands do not qualify for an EEZ) would be a loss of regional prestige against a 
sometimes-threatening neighbor. 
The DPJ is not as dependent upon nationalist voters as the LDP is, as 
demonstrated by the promise of the Kan government not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine 
earlier this year.  However, they still cannot afford to alienate the nationalist groups 
entirely.  The Japanese bureaucratic structure ensures that many LDP supporters retain 
positions of considerable influence, and the DPJ's position in the Diet is far from certain.  
The Japanese public is not so easily inflamed by nationalist issues as China is currently, 
but those who feel strongly remain very politically active and influential. 
For the moment, there seems to be little chance of a genuine resolution to the East 
China Sea dispute.  The existing “principled agreement” to jointly exploit certain 
resources without comment to territorial claims is a positive step, but far from conclusive.  
China continues development of the Chunxiao field, and Japanese developments have 
been gaining momentum.  These drilling zones may eventually push the East China Sea 
dispute to a more heated level, since the entire reason there was ever a dispute at all are 
those seabed resources.  Compromise seems unlikely in the current political climate, and 
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the strategic nature of the energy resources means both nations have a very real stake in 
what they are able to retain. 
The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands seem almost less likely to be resolved in the near 
future.  Deng Xiaoping stated that the islands dispute should be left to posterity in 1978.
63
  
Some thirty years later, the squabble remains in full force.  Leaders from both nations 
face difficulties in restraining the actions of nationalists seeking to assert their views on 
the island claims, due in part at least to the relative accessibility of the islands by small 
boat.  
 Neither government wishes to lose any domestic support, but the derailing of 
relations over the actions of individuals is inconvenient to say the least.  Both Japan and 
China wish to avoid even unintentionally seeming to back the other's claims, which 
makes it difficult to discipline individuals involved in such escapades.  However, for this 
dispute to ever see any resolution, it is necessary for leaders to set the agenda and address 
national attitudes about the islands to try and bring them to a calmer level, rather than 
allowing citizens to set the agenda themselves, seemingly at whim. 
The issues of territory in the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute are tied to the historical 
issues between Japan and China.  The East China Sea has no historical conflict to 
magnify it, but it is embittered by the larger rivalry between the two nations.  Building 
public support for any compromise will first require nationalist detachment from these 
issues, and that is a difficult thing to engineer.  For the moment, the influence of 
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nationalism on these issues prevents their resolution, or even negotiation in good faith 
rather than posturing for domestic constituencies.  Military action seems unlikely due to 
the enormous costs of such operations, not just of the action itself, but the loss of trade.  
Therefore, it seems likely that both governments will protest and shelve, repeatedly, until 



















Chapter 4:  Yasukuni Shrine 
 Of all the historical issues that inflame the passions of Japan's neighbors, 
Yasukuni Shrine seems to be the single largest target.   The stated purpose of the shrine is 
to honor Japan's war dead, those who died fighting on behalf of the Japanese Empire.  To 
many Japanese, it is a place to pay respects to lost family members and others killed by 
war.  To neighboring nations, it is a lingering symbol of Japan's Imperial past, and a 
memorial glorifying and idealizing Japan's behavior during the war.  The historical issues 
for China include the devastation inflicted by the Japanese invasion during the Second 
Sino-Japanese War, as well as the perception of lingering and even resurgent Japanese 
militarism.  
 This chapter will examine the historical barriers that Yasukuni Shrine presents in 
Sino-Japanese relations, including the history of the shrine itself and the conflicted role it 
plays within Japanese society.  There is certainly no single interpretation of the shrine 
within Japan, though there are very strong feelings about it on several sides.  The political 
aspects of the shrine have direct effects on Japanese domestic politics, when leaders court 
the conservative vote, and on Sino-Japanese relations, when courting said vote angers 
neighbors.   
 Japanese domestic groups such as the War-bereaved Society provide enormous 
political capital to politicians who cater to their interests.  In desiring shrine visits, the 
War-bereaved Society acts at Level II without interest in international impact.  The Level 
I impact comes from international reaction to visits by top Japanese politicians to the 
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shrine.  This is not a traditional Two-level meeting in which a treaty is on the table being 
discussed, but a negotiation in which a domestic event has triggered an international 
discussion.  However, unlike with the Diaoyu/Senkaku incidents, it is the action of an 
executive that causes the incident, and so that executive must balance his Level II 
constituency against peace with the Level I neighbors. 
 Why do so many major Japanese public figures continue to visit or at least send 
offerings to the shrine?  How powerful are the forces surrounding it, and what do they 
represent in Japanese politics?  Why does the shrine incite such anger in Japan's 
neighbors?  It is rare for a single place or symbolic gesture to hold such power in an 
international relationship.  The shrine's unique status can lend some insight into major 
unresolved issues of war memory that remain open between China and Japan. 
 Sino-Japanese relations were very nearly brought to a halt between 2001 and 2005 
by Koizumi's repeated visits to Yasukuni Shrine while in office.   Koizumi needed the 
Level II political capital to be gained from visiting the shrine to push forward his 
domestic agenda, but it came at a tremendous Level I cost in relations with China and 
eventually Korea.  These shrine visits, the motives behind them, and the effect that they 
have on Sino-Japanese relations are a revealing case study of conflicting policy 
objectives facing policymakers at the domestic and international levels.  To examine why 
Koizumi’s visitations were so contentious, a few words on the history and  status of the 




The Shrine Itself 
 Yasukuni Shrine houses roughly two and a half million souls.  Not bodies; there 
are no human remains stored in Yasukuni Shrine, as with all Shinto shrines.  It is 
intended to house the “honored war dead” who fought on the Japanese side during a 
number of conflicts, most notably the Second Sino-Japanese War that lead into Japan's 
participation in WWII.   
 The Yasukuni Shrine was first constructed in 1869 as a repository for dead of the 
Meiji revolutionary forces.  Its buildings and grounds were expanded to incorporate more 
and more military dead from successive Imperial-era conflicts.  With the creation and 
promulgation of state Shinto in Japan, it became a primary location of the Imperial creed.  
In 1946, the Allied Occupation declared a constitutional separation of church and state, 
and since that time Yasukuni has been a privately funded religious institution. Its major 
rites are still attended by thousands of worshipers—and protesters. 
 In order to become one of the “honored war dead,” a person had to die in battle or 
from wounds caused by battle while in honorable service to the Japanese military.  
Dishonorable discharges or those executed for crimes by the military were not supposed 
to be eligible.  In practice, as long as the individual has not been court-martialed, they 
were considered eligible for enshrinement.  This was a tactic to increase enshrinement 
and thus the number of people who were connected personally to Yasukuni.
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 The kami or spirit of the honored war dead would be symbolically invited into the 
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shrine and purified before being added to the collective kami of the shrine itself.  The 
dead soldiers became vital spiritual resources of the nation, and reverence for their 
sacrifice became synonymous with reverence for the nation.
65
  The Emperor made 
frequent visits to Yasukuni shrine during its heyday, and the Emperor's mourning for the 
fallen soldiers was an important part of the ritual of enshrinement prior to Occupation.  
This transformation of personal mourning into national mourning granted some 
consolation to the families who had faced losses. 
 Today, Yasukuni Shrine remains as a monument to these war dead.  Interments at 
the shrine have continued sporadically into the modern day, as remains from the war 
continued to be found.  The majority of war dead were actually enshrined after the end of 
WWII, though the rituals used were altered to remove the focus on unifying the Emperor 
with the military.66  Each year, thousands of worshipers come to the shrine to pay their 
respects to lost relatives and friends from the war. 
 In 1875, the Meiji administration required that all war dead be interred at 
Yasukuni.  During WWII, the shrine was a beacon of national mourning, and also a target 
of some popular anger against a nation that had taken so many young men off to death.  
Official enshrinement processions were increasingly met with accusations of murder 
from mourners.  Even during wartime under very strict sedition laws, the police did not 
arrest these grieving protesters.  Popular songs voiced very carefully-couched resistance 
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to the enforcement of Yasukuni's central role.67  
  Additionally, there are an estimated 20,000 Koreans and 20,000 Taiwanese 
enshrined at Yasukuni, individuals who were conscripted or whom even occasionally 
willingly joined the Japanese military to escape colonial racism.  In 1978,  a Taiwanese 
family demanded their son should be withdrawn from the registers at Yasukuni Shrine.  
Other families followed suit, and lawsuits against the Japanese government followed.  
Shrine officials have consistently refused all such requests, stating that the individuals 
were considered Japanese when they died, and do not cease being Japanese after their 




 Many names have been added, however.  Unveiled documents have revealed a 
multitude of meetings between officials from the Japanese Ministry of Health and 
Yasukuni Shrine officials, in violation of constitutional principles.  At these meetings, 
Ministry officials urged shrine officials to add convicted war criminals to the ranks of 
war dead.  Their official opinion was that the war ended with Occupation in 1951, and so 
all of those who died serving the state during that time period should be enshrined.  As 
time passed and the war seemed more distant, it became more acceptable to some parties 
to allow the enshrinement of these criminals, due to the feeling that they had all died in 
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the line of duty.
69
  
 Class B and C war criminals began to be enshrined after 1958, quietly and without 
public fanfare.  The shrine officials resisted enshrining Class A war criminals for over 
thirty years after the end of the war, however.  This seems to have been the policy of the 
chief priest of Yasukuni until 1977, Tsukuba Fujimaro, and he was adamantly resistant to 
the enshrinement of these persons.  His successor, Matasudaira Nagayoshi, immediately 
allowed the Class A criminals to be enshrined in 1978, though again without public 
fanfare.
70
  When the media caught wind of this enshrinement, a scandal erupted.  Many 
Japanese felt this measure was inappropriate.  
 The Showa Emperor visited the Yasukuni Shrine frequently prior to the 
enshrinement of the Class A criminals, and his cessation after that time was long a 
subject of public speculation.  Published diary excerpts from officials close to him have 
since revealed that it was his anger at the Class A enshrinement that kept him from the 
shrine until his death in 1989. 
71
   
 In addition to its ritual purposes, there is also a museum of Japanese Imperial 
military history operated on the shrine grounds.  Called the Yūshūkan, this museum 
glorifies and sanitizes Japan's military past, omitting mention of atrocities and even 
defeat.  Patriotic songs play softly in the background as visitors are greeted with displays 
telling the story of the glorious war of liberation from western powers in Asia.  The 
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emphasis is upon their heroic sacrifice, and the bond between family and nation—at no 
point are there mentions of suffering wrought by the forces represented in the museum.
72
 
   This presentation of history is consistent with the most conservative views of 
Japan's military adventurism.  Its existence is justified as “respecting the war dead” and 
honoring their sacrifices.73  Coupled with the shrine's housing of Japanese soldiers, it 
adds considerably to the shrine's image as a monument to a wartime legacy that has not 
been fully addressed.  The Yūshūkan was re-opened for the first time since the war in 
1985, the same year as the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Museum in China, though this is 
a coincidental event. 
 The Class A enshrinement has been a serious point of contention in Japan since it 
occurred.   Shrine officials have resisted any “state interference” in attempting to remove 
those names from the shrine registers, despite attempts even by such figures as Nakasone 
Yasuhiro, the conservative prime minister who made a point of visiting Yasukuni in the 
1980s.  Given that the shrine is a privately funded religious institution, there is little that 
the state can do without further breaching constitutional limits.
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 Despite these scandals and difficulties that have rocked the shrine and the nation, 
Yasukuni Shrine remains a poignant memorial to a large number of dead.  There is 
Yasukuni, the memorial to the cruel excesses of Japan's Imperial era, the war machine 
that chewed up a large portion of East Asia.  There is also Yasukuni, a shrine that houses 
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the kami of two million people, mostly young men coerced to fight at the behest of a 
state, tragically destroyed by war.  This split perception is far from resolved in the 
Japanese consciousness, and the discussion of how to address Yasukuni's complicated 
legacy is ongoing. 
Personal Grief, Political Gain 
 Since the Yasukuni Shrine was no longer able to receive state funding after 1946, 
it required private donors to fill the gap.  Conveniently, the war had deprived a large 
number of families of young men who had been important in their lives.  Sons and 
husbands were enshrined in large numbers—and their survivors formed a special interest 
group to lobby the government. This group is known as the War-bereaved Society 
(izokukai) and they are a powerful force in Japanese politics today. 
 The War-bereaved Society is composed of two primary groups: young widows 
who lost their government pensions after the war, and had few economic opportunities of 
their own, and older parents, especially fathers, who were unwilling to see their sons 
dishonored in defeat by branding the war as immoral.
75
   
 For many of the families involved, seeing their loved ones cast as villains of the 
war would also implicate themselves.  The suffering of the war widows allowed the War-
bereaved Society to put a human face on grief and the destruction of war, and to focus on 
the narrative of victimization of the Japanese.  Eventually, war veterans and disabled 
servicemen and their families would also be included among those seeking solace 
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together.   
 The War-bereaved Society is at the forefront of Japanese efforts to preserve the 
legacy of the honored war dead.  The deaths of young soldiers were a sacrifice for 
national pride and for regional peace.  They contend that this pride is not being taught to 
modern youth, creating a depressed and listless cohort.  The apathy of successive 
generations is taken as proof of the lack of this proper pride and energy.
76
 
 As a part of this activism, the War-bereaved Society is closely connected to 
Yasukuni.  The shrine literally would not be able to operate without their fundraising 
efforts.
77
  They support the enshrinement and reverence given to their own relations, and 
correspondingly identify the sacrifice of those lost relations with the Japanese state and 
national pride.  The focus on the narrative of Japan as a victim is paired with a narrative 
casting Japan as liberator from colonial oppression, rather than Japan as colonial invader 
in its own right.  Even the Class A war criminals are exonerated in death as victims of 
national policy by some members.
78
  However, the revelation of the Showa Emperor's 
disdain for visiting the shrine after the Class A enshrinement has pushed others in the 
War-bereaved Society to form a study group to analyze the possibility of their removal.
79
 
 The political activities of the War-bereaved Society creates a large number of 
votes for candidates that they favor.  Their organization and motivation as a political 
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force permits them a high level of influence on many politicians.  As well, the 
membership of the War-bereaved Society has always included members of many 
influential families, and their president is always a distinguished public figure. 
 The War-bereaved act as a vital and reliable voting bloc for the LDP, for 
candidates that they favor.  For many decades, this has brought them concessions they 
desired, such as various pension laws and official (“personal”) visits by prime ministers.  
After the enshrinement of Class A criminals the ministerial visitations became very 
controversial and largely ceased, with some notable exceptions.  However, if a prime 
minister wishes to ensure their vote, they simply have to visit Yasukuni  Shrine, 
especially around August 15
th
.   
 The influence of the War-bereaved Society is disproportionate to their numbers, 
both because of the influential nature of their membership, and because of their discipline 
as a vote-getting unit.  They hold great influence with the LDP and with other 
conservative groups.  Yasukuni Shrine is a conservative symbol to many groups in Japan, 
and the War-bereaved Society is simply the most historically-rooted and influential of 
these.  For Japanese leadership in conservative factions (often LDP, but not always) there 
is no easier route to securing votes than courting those through the shrine. 
Apologies Not Accepted 
 China and Korea have long demanded apologies from Japan for a long list of 
wartime atrocities.  Japan has made apologies, though they have never been satisfactory 
to Japan's neighbors for a number of reasons, including lack of legislative acceptance by 
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the Diet, and the specifics of phrasing chosen by the apologizing officials. Apologies that 
are not rooted in legislative resolutions feel incomplete to China and Korea, as though 
they were words of the individual official rather than the genuine repentance of one 
nation to another.  There is considerable resistance within Japanese politics to making 
these apologies.  Some of this stems from movements which outright deny any historical 
wrongdoing, and others simply resist any motions which would cause Japan to look weak 
or lose prestige.   
 This has resulted in an unsuccessful end to well-intentioned legislation, such as 
prime minister Murayama's attempt at an apology resolution to be approved by the Diet 
in 1995.  Murayama issued a statement in 1995 that is the most direct apology by a 
Japanese official, particularly a prime minister.  There was also an attempt to draft a 
resolution of apology on the 50
th
 anniversary of the defeat in WWII.  However, it 
encountered stiff resistance from conservative groups such as the War-bereaved Society 
that opposed any such acknowledgment of failure and atrocity on the part of Japanese 
soldiers.   
 In addition, the Yūshūkan military museum on the Yasukuni grounds was 
redesigned in this year to more prominently glorify the “greatest sacrifices” made by 
Japanese during the war, such as kamikaze pilots. The presentation was altered to 
emphasize Japan's wartime role in Asia as a war of liberation from western powers with 
no mention of conquest.
80
  These redesigned displays remain to the current day, despite 
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protests over the content. 
 The failure of such measures always makes apologies issued by Japan seem 
hollow.  The lack of direct compensatory action adds to this impression.  Japan has given 
billions of dollars' worth in ODA since WWII, but this has never been explicitly 
expressed as wartime compensation, even when it was intended in that manner.  Japan's 
neighboring nations often bear the scars of Japanese occupation without acknowledgment 
from the Japanese government. 
 For China, the Yasukuni Shrine represents Japanese militarism's greatest excesses, 
and pays homage to soldiers who raped and pillaged their way across a substantial 
portion of the Chinese countryside.  The narrative of national humiliation chronicles 
China's suffering under a succession of outrages at the hands of foreigners, ending with 
Japan as the last and the worst of the outsiders who sought to bring China to its knees
81
.  
When Japanese leaders visit the shrine, it is opening these old wounds once again, 
injuries for which China feels Japan has never properly apologized. 
 The Chinese public is not overreacting to draw a connection between the 
Yasukuni Shrine and Japan's military past.  It is a monument to that past.  However, this 
viewpoint does not grasp the nuanced nature of the reaction of the Japanese public to the 
shrine.  The Chinese media trades on sensationalism about Japan, and Yasukuni Shrine is 
no exception.  Yasukuni Shrine occupies a close cognitive space with the Nanjing 
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Massacre and other Japanese wartime atrocities, since it is a monument to many of the 
soldiers who may have committed or even ordered those acts to be done. 
 In Sino-Japanese bilateral diplomacy, China takes an aggressive stance when it 
comes to official ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine.  Lower level officials may visit, or 
make comments which arouse controversy, but they do not receive protests from the 
Chinese government, and with good reason.  When the leader of the country visits 
Yasukuni, however, it becomes a more serious problem for Beijing.  It seems much more 
like an official endorsement of the shrine and its contents.  It has been China's stance 
since at least the presidency of Jiang Zemin that Japan still owes China official apologies 
and possibly compensation for wartime offenses.
82
  When Japan takes actions that seem 
to glorify or point back to its military past, China is immediately on guard. 
A Question of Leadership 
 The 1978 enshrinement of the Class A war criminals created controversy 
primarily within Japan.  Prime ministers visited Yasukuni frequently prior to the Class A 
enshrinement.
83
  Ohira Masayoshi and Suzuki Kantaro also visited after the Class A 
enshrinement, in 1979 and 1982 respectively.  However, it was Nakasone Yasuhiro's visit 
in 1985 that generated international attention.  Nakasone visited the shrine and signed the 
guest register as “Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro,” along with bringing an offering of 
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flowers purchased with public funds.
84
  This violated two articles of the Japanese 
constitution.  Article 20 forbids the state and its organs from participating in religious 
activity.  Article 89 forbids public support for religious institutions.  This visit created a 
flurry of controversy in Japan for the prime minister's flouting of the law, and 
internationally, for seeming like official reverence for Class-A war criminals. 
 After Nakasone, only two prime ministers have visited the shrine.  One of the 
leaders of the resistance to the Murayama apology was  Hashimoto Ryūtarō, head of the 
LDP at the time, but also a former president of the War-bereaved Society.  Hashimoto 
would go on to visit Yasukuni during his tenure as prime minister, though as it was very 
carefully managed as private worship and done on his birthday (July 29) rather than on or 
around August 15th, it did not create the major protest of other visits.
85
 
 Koizumi is the only recent prime minister to make visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, 
and his repeated visitation basically brought Sino-Japanese relations to a halt for several 
years.  Koizumi's choice to visit was motivated entirely by a need to shore up his 
domestic constituency.  When China demanded repeatedly that he cease and apologize 
for shrine visitations, Koizumi continued to resist in order to bolster his image of 
toughness in the Japanese and world media.  All of Koizumi's visits were presented as 
“personal” visits, and therefore not the business of state.  This is a thin excuse and fooled 
no one as to the meaning of his presence at the shrine. It gained Koizumi the domestic 
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political capital that he needed, but brought many important issues with China to a 
complete halt until he had left office.   
 Why Koizumi persisted in Yasukuni Shrine visitations is a question that 
commentators have been asking repeatedly even since before the first visit.  The initial 
cause seems to be that he wanted to shore up his electoral credibility among reliable 
ultra-nationalist bloc, which had previously favored his rival.
86
  All politicians must have 
a stable domestic coalition before they can formulate any international negotiating 
strategies.  However, the cost of Koizumi's domestic strategy was creating a deadlock 
with China that lasted for almost five years, and created a great deal of popular ill-will for 
Japan within the Chinese media. 
 Koizumi's Chinese counterpart in this time period was Jiang Zemin.  Jiang was a 
compromise successor to Deng Xiaoping, and lacked confidence in his position.  He 
chose a strategy of showing his strength in attacking Japan on the history issue.  Jiang 
Zemin oversaw the implementation of the “patriotic education campaigns” that have had 
such an impact on popular Chinese attitudes toward Japan in 1994.  The fiftieth 
anniversary of the victory over Japan in the Second Sino-Japanese War received 
enormous attention in 1995, an event which Jiang was able to capitalize upon heavily. 
 In 1998, Jiang Zemin made a state visit to Japan in which he repeatedly demanded 
a written apology from the Japanese government, even during a televised dinner with the 
Emperor.  Jiang's forcefulness played very well on the domestic front, but it created a 
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popular backlash against China in Japan.
87
  While China tried to back away from the 
direct confrontational tone set by the 1998 visit, Koizumi's initial 2001 visit to the 
Yasukuni Shrine  immediately required a harsh response. 
 Simply put, when Koizumi visited the shrine, it came across as a slap in the face 
to Chinese citizens who had been educated for years on the injuries inflicted by Japanese 
soldiers upon the Chinese people.  The Yasukuni Shrine professes to be a monument of 
grief to those killed in the war, but it honors the Imperial wars through the Yūshūkan and 
venerates the Class A war criminals who orchestrated so much of this suffering.  For 
many Chinese, it is a site of great anger that reached a boiling point when it seemed that 
the Japanese government was endorsing these negative aspects of the shrine through the 
visit of its top leader. 
 Jiang Zemin had helped orchestrate the education on the evils of Japan's past, and 
part of that narrative involved the heroic victory of the CCP (and KMT) against the 
invaders.  A great deal of the Party's legitimacy was tied up in defending national honor 
from “western” interests that would again try to exploit and weaken the Chinese, and to 
right the wrongs of history.  When Koizumi visited the shrine, all of these promises to the 
people had to be kept.  National anger had to be appeased. 
 Very little progress seems to have been possible while both Jiang and Koizumi 
were in office.  Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin in 2003, and while he had more 
confidence in his position, he still had to maintain some continuity with previous 
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administration in order to retain support from Jiang's faction. Hu has operated with the 
goal of repairing relations with Japan, though until Koizumi left office, there was little 
that could be done.  The shrine visits essentially prevented any high-level meetings 
between Japan and China. 
 Abe Shinzō succeeded Koizumi in 2006, and worked with the explicit goal of 
improving Sino-Japanese relations.  He still sent offerings to Yasukuni, but did not 
present them himself.  Abe and Hu were able to resume high-level summit meetings and 
repair some of the damage done to relations by the Yasukuni visits, not least because Abe 
himself never attended the shrine while he was prime minister.   
 Since Koizumi, no other prime ministers have visited the shrine, though some 
cabinet ministers have continued to do so.  Kan Naoto of the DPJ worked with his entire 
cabinet and pledged not to visit Yasukuni Shrine in 2010, a gesture of goodwill that was 
unfortunately lost against the later trawler incident.
88
  The DPJ is not as dependent upon 
nationalistic votes as the LDP, and part of the party's stated platform is reaching out to 
other Asian nations to cultivate closer relations. 
Housing History 
 While visiting the Yasukuni Shrine is an entirely symbolic gesture, what it 
represents outside of Japan is far more negative than the conflicted representation within 
Japan.  It is not possible for a prime minister to avoid the Level I concerns of other 
nations when they visit the shrine.  Choosing to make a visit  can create some powerful 
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Level II domestic capital for a prime minister, but it comes at the very harsh cost of 
damaging relations with Japan's neighbors, particularly China.  The Level I 
considerations do not take the form of a traditional treaty agreement, but these domestic 
pressures play directly into the sensitivities of Japan's neighbors, particularly China.  
China is then faced with its own Level II pressure to react, or lose legitimacy in the eyes 
of its citizens.   
 Japanese nationalists perpetually demand that prime ministers go boldly to the 
shrine, and honor the legacy of the war dead.  The Chinese demand in this case, simply 
that prime ministers not go to Yasukuni shrine, seems fairly reasonable given the 
implications of the shrine controversy.  This creates little in the way of a compatible win-
set for a prime minister who is dependent upon Level II Japanese nationalists for vote-
getting influence. 
 In one comment of rare candor in Japanese politics, a former governor noted that 
“There is no cheaper, more effective campaign strategy than to profess sympathy for and 
promote the interests of the Bereaved Families' Association.”89  This kind of domestic 
support is difficult for a politician to ignore.  It is possible for a prime minister to support 
the interests of the War-bereaved Society without going to Yasukuni Shrine, but the 
single most effective gesture they can make is a shrine visit.  Trading a single afternoon 
for powerful electoral support is a tempting maneuver.   
 However, there are political costs to these visits even within Japan.   There have 
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been eleven separate court rulings about prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni shrine, 
several of them declaring the visits unconstitutional.90  The public debate over the legacy 
and meaning of Yasukuni is visible in the “circus” every August 15
th
, with shrine 
supporters and protesters converging to express their views.  This is in addition to the 
greater costs inflicted upon Sino-Japanese relations by choosing to cultivate this domestic 
constituency.   
 The Chinese public simply will not accept any prime ministerial visits to 
Yasukuni Shrine.  The shrine's very existence is considered testament to Japan's ongoing 
militarism by some in China. For a leader to visit the shrine is a wholly unacceptable 
gesture, and represents a deep disrespect for the injury caused to China by Japan.  For 
Level I Sino-Japanese relations to continue at all, it is necessary that prime ministers 
refrain from visiting the shrine while in office.   
 Recent revelations of the Emperor's disdain for the Class A enshrinements at 
Yasukuni has spurred motion even from the War-bereaved Society to encourage the 
removal of those individuals from the shrine.  While some factions in Japan still reject the 
Occupation's war crime tribunals as valid, the removal of the Class A criminals would 
help to reduce the controversial nature of the shrine, and no longer seem to be honoring 
those who did the most to bring about such destruction.  Shrine officials continue to resist 
any such move, and only time will tell if it will be possible. 
 Memories of the war remain a diplomatic obstacle for China and Japan, and 
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Yasukuni Shrine is quite possibly the single largest symbol of that conflict. The  
Yūshūkan can be paired against the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Museum in China, and 
together they present two vastly different versions of wartime events.  Chinese leadership 
has played up their victory over the Japanese invaders as a means of gaining political 
legitimacy. One can track expansions of the Nanjing Museum to periods of sharp increase 
in Chinese nationalistic activity.
91
  Japanese nationalists remain a strong force in politics, 
meanwhile, and their narrative of the war whitewashes or glosses over the suffering of 
victims of Japan. 
 The issues of history between Japan and China are tied up in nationalist myths for 
both countries.  China must aggressively seek to right the wrongs suffered by its people 
in the past, in order to maintain the narrative of national humiliation and struggle that 
helps to unify a diverse populace going through many painful systematic transitions.  The 
LDP has struggled for some time to produce leadership which could unite enough 
political capital to make necessary reforms in a sagging economy.  The recent DPJ 
government has been faced with many similar issues, and it remains to be seen if they can 
retain their grip on power.  Playing to nationalistic voters has always been a reliable 
strategy in Japan, but it has the critical side effect of frequently damaging relations with 
Japan's neighbors.  
 For future progress, Japanese prime ministers must avoid visiting Yasukuni. This 
message seems to have been effectively transmitted after Koizumi. The added step of 
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statements of intention to refrain from visiting such as Kan issued this year are a positive 
gesture as well, and hopefully that can be continued.  Removing the Class A war 
criminals from the shrine would take away much of its current repugnance, though it 
remains to be seen if this can be done.  In Sino-Japanese relations, Yasukuni Shrine is a 
destructive force in its current form, and avoiding it does little to create goodwill but can 


















Chapter 5:  Textbook Controversy 
 War memory and its dissemination remain a powerful obstacle to Sino-Japanese 
relations, despite the distance of seventy years from the actual conflict.  The obstacle is 
observable in the reactions to the Yasukuni Shrine, but for many Chinese, the shrine is 
simply the most visible manifestation of a vaster and more insidious web of evasion on 
the part of the Japanese government and the people with regards to acts of the past.  This 
is present in the lack of officially expressed contrition by all levels of government, in 
remaining negative popular attitudes towards other Asian peoples, and in the periodic 
flareup of the so-called “textbook controversy.”   
 The term “textbook controversy” refers to an ongoing dispute that started in the 
early 1980s.  The essence of the dispute lies in the process by which the Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) authorizes all textbooks to 
be made available in schools.  Frequently, MEXT has used this power to require 
alterations that soften or eliminates depictions of Japan in WWII.  The Chinese 
government protests these depictions of events, and has gone so far as to demand that 
MEXT enforce specific changes in texts according to its specifications.   
 In this chapter I will examine the intersection of history, war memory, and 
international relations over the MEXT textbook screening process.  In particular I will 
focus on the crises of 2001 and 2005, incidents which occurred during the greater Sino-
Japanese relations crisis of the Koizumi years.  Focusing on these years will allow for a 
greater contextualization of the larger historical issues that remain unresolved between 
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China and Japan, as well as the compounding effects of popular nationalism on 
international incidents.   
 The Level II domestic climate in these two years was heavily influenced by other 
international incidents which evoked a strong popular response, such as Kozumi's 
Yasukuni Shrine visit in 2001, and  Japan's UN Security Council bid in 2005.  While 
these disputes were being handled at Level I, domestic coalitions in both China and Japan 
organized to press for their interests as they perceived them—Japanese conservatives 
wanting their narratives to remain prominent, or to receive shrine visits, and Chinese 
nationalists wanting their government to protect their interests and perhaps to some 
degree, to punish Japan. 
 The creation of a historical narrative can fulfill many purposes, including the 
seeking of some level of factual truth, the building of popular loyalty and patriotism for 
the nation-state, or the critical examination of mistakes of the past.  Japan's wartime 
history is still contested within the nation, and the legacy of those war years that will be 
handed down to children is a matter of public concern.    
 One group of nationalists in Japan decided to create a textbook intended to instill 
what they considered a more fitting national pride in Japanese youth, and which 
whitewashed Japan's wartime history.  The Ministry's approval of this text provoked a 
protest from China and Korea, and those protests in turn created a backlash from 
Japanese citizens as unwelcome interference in Japan's domestic affairs.  Examining the 
history and evolution of the Japanese textbooks and the international reaction they 
91 
 
received can help unravel some of the disagreements over historical narrative that drive 
Japan and China apart. 
A Troubled Passage 
 After WWII, the Japanese government had to reassemble much of its 
organization.  During the Occupation (1945-52), anyone convicted of war crimes or 
deemed overly supportive of the war effort was barred from the civil service.  This 
changed after the Occupation, and many purged officials returned to power.  There was 
(and is) a perception among some Japanese that the Occupation war crimes trials 
represented victor's justice, as American atrocities were not prosecuted, and so this return 
of purged individuals was appropriate.   
 The US government's shift in focus from being pro-democracy to anti-Communist 
furthered the entrenchment of conservative and nationalist elements in the Japanese 
government, since they most vehemently shared the goals of the US.  This resulted in the 
Japanese Ministry of Education being taken over by nationalists who had no interest in 
addressing questions of wartime guilt or significantly shifting the Japanese historical 
narrative beyond what would survive US Occupation examination.
92
   
 This conservative takeover in government has persisted to this day, though the 
modern LDP is quite different from the institution founded in 1955.  MEXT has 
represented these conservative origins in its textbook screening process, resisting 
attempts to represent Japanese history in a critical light.  Many of these alterations focus 
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specifically on WWII-era atrocities by Japanese soldiers, such as the Nanjing Massacre 
and the Comfort Women scandal.   
 The screening process is performed by the Textbook Screening Council of 
MEXT, which is composed of regular employees of the Ministry.  The specific historical 
criteria used is not defined, though MEXT has described its views as based upon 
objective facts, presented with minimal analysis in order to avoid what it terms “bias.”
93
  
The screening process is held every four years.   
 MEXT's screening process is not without criticism from within Japan itself.  One 
of the primary critics was Ienaga Saburo, a teacher and history textbook author who was 
rejected by MEXT's screening process and responded by filing three different lawsuits 
against the government.  Starting in 1965, he fought a decades-long battle that was taken 
up by many other liberal scholars and historians in defense of academic freedom and 
historical integrity.   
 At stake in Ienaga's battle was the very nature of what constituted history, and 
how methods and facts could or should be combined to create a narrative that was 
accessible to students.  The government's position was stated as “objective” or “realist,” 
desiring that facts should be presented without any interpretation so that they could speak 
for themselves.  However, when confronted with facts that contradicted the government's 
preferred position, they would very quickly revert to a relativist position, maintaining that 
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such things simply cannot be fully verified.
94
  The state was unable to defend its own 
view of history, though the textbook screening process was allowed to continue. 
 The three lawsuits attacked the constitutionality of the screening process itself, as 
well as the specific level of discretionary power that MEXT should have in requesting 
changes to textbooks.  Ienaga's legal battles attracted a large amount of intellectual and 
public attention as they progressed, and became something of a focal point for wider 
public debate over educational reform.   
 In the end, Ienaga lost the fight to have the textbook screening process declared 
unconstitutional as a form of censorship.  However, Ienaga did win several points of 
contention in which MEXT was found to be in error and infringed on his freedom of 
speech.  The results of his battles against the government have brought the debate over 
freedom of speech and proper historical narrative a much higher profile in Japan than it 
might otherwise have had.  
 Nozaki Yoshiko has examined the contents of the textbooks themselves.  She 
found that the content of texts shifted significantly over time, with publishers themselves 
including more and more descriptions of Japanese atrocities, even with required editing, 
all through the 1980s and 1990s.  More recent movements towards “self-censorship” on 
the part of publishers have been revealed to be the result of ongoing political coercion on 
the part of MEXT and the Office of the Prime Minister.
95
  The DPJ has expressed a desire 
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for greater historical reconciliation with Asian neighbors, though they have not put this 
into the screening practice in any visible way.
96
   
 History Made 
 Japan's domestic textbook squabbles have extended far into the past, and will 
continue into the future.  Other nations did not get involved in Japan's textbook screening 
process until 1982.  In this year, the Japanese media broadcast the views of many 
protesters of the textbook approval process, alongside specific examples of changes that 
might alarm Japanese readers.  The reported changes included the substitution of 
“advancement” for “aggression” in the texts, in reference to Japan's movement into 
China, minimization and softening of descriptions of the Nanjing Massacre that included 
avoidance of the word “atrocity,” descriptions of the murder of Okinawans by Japanese 
soldiers, as well as other controversial historical references. 
 Of these changes, the first, the substitution of “advancement” for “aggression,” 
had actually occurred much earlier in the 1960s and simply not reached the media before 
1982.  The media erroneously reported this as a change in the 1981 cycle.  Japanese 
conservatives leaped upon this error and made it central to their critique of the media's 




 Other nations found these changes alarming as well, though they only became 
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aware of the textbook screen controversy through reports in the Japanese media objecting 
to MEXT's actions.  There was serious domestic debate within Japan over the 
appropriateness of particular changes and the screening process itself.  The Japanese 
media reported a strengthening of the screening process and government controls over 
textbook content.  However, this was the first time that news of these changes had 
reached overseas and brought back protest from abroad.
98
 
 These international protests caused the cabinet secretary at the time to issue a 
statement of apology, as well as issuing a communique promising greater sensitivity to 
the injuries suffered by Asia at the hands of the Japanese military.  There were public 
announcements made urging greater attention to the injuries inflicted by Japan in history, 
and promises to end particular Ministry-authored edits.  Most notably, this included the 
infamous replacement of “aggression” with “advancement.”  Korea was willing to accept 
these gestures, though China was less willing to simply take Japan's word that reform 
would occur. 
 Textbook authors reported little change in the process of screening, however.  To 
be sure, some details that had previously been challenged were able to escape screening, 
such as victim figures over 200,000 for the Nanjing Massacre and descriptions of the 
massacre of Okinawans by Japanese forces.
99
  However, the process as a whole was 
largely unchanged.  The conservative forces in Japanese politics rallied, and Prime 
Minister Nakasone (noted previously for his visits to Yasukuni Shrine) entered office, 
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bringing with him a push for yet more rightist reform in government that prevented 
possibilities of textbook reform at that time. 
 At this time China was only beginning its reform agenda under Deng Xiaoping.  
Protests from China over the textbook issues originated after Japanese media sources 
reported upon the same problem.  However, the complaints were over issues with 
portrayals of incidents that occurred in China, such as the aforementioned replacement of 
“aggression” with “advancement.”  1982 was the first time that the portrayal of history in 
Japan would be important to China, and then only because the Japanese media made it 
available.  This initial international textbook controversy raised questions about war guilt 
that have remained largely unanswered to this day. 
 Japanese conservatives rallied after the 1982 controversy and protested China's 
intrusion into Japan's domestic affairs, feeling humiliated that the government would 
apologize.
100
  They were unable to exercise much Level II influence on the handling of 
the 1982 incident, because they were unprepared for the international reaction that 
occurred.  The 1982 incident was the genesis of a conservative movement to write a “new 
history textbook” that would represent events more to their satisfaction. 
 2001 
 In 2001, MEXT approved a new textbook.  This was not unusual, as 2001 was a 
normal screening year.  However, this text was a new edition of a textbook written by a 
Japanese nationalist group called the Japan Society for History Textbook Reform 
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(JSHTR).  This text  intentionally downplayed the Japanese atrocities of WWII and 
sought to instill a patriotic love of the nation in Japanese youth.   
 The JSHTR had been formed in 1996, and was the latest incarnation of attempts 
by conservatives to publish right-wing history texts since the 1980s.  The formation was a 
direct response to the views of history expressed by former prime minister Murayama's 
failure to secure a Diet resolution apologizing to Asian peoples for wartime atrocities.  
Members included prominent academics and media figures.  They accused the 
government and left-leaning publications of spreading “masochistic views” among young 
people.
101
   
 The textbook written by the JSHTR is a collection of Japanese conservative 
ideals, presenting such items as the Japanese war in East Asia being a war of liberation 
from western oppression,  the Nanjing massacre as a footnote that states the issue is 
“under debate,” encouraging centrality of the emperor, and claims that Japan has lost its 
direction in the years after the war.
102
  The book is intended to encourage patriotic pride 
in Japanese youth, but it does so at the cost of critical examination of events and 
historical accuracy.  Many Japanese historians and commentators have voiced criticism 
of the text's message. 
 The JSHTR's text received heavy criticism from academics, teachers, and even 
concerned parents.  A member of the Textbook Screening Council of MEXT raised 
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serious questions about the controversial content of the text, and discussed the possibility 
of rejection with other members.  This was met with an immediate public backlash from 
conservative publications and commentators, reporting that the rejection of the text was 
being “engineered.”  The council member was eventually transferred to a new position 
within MEXT.  As well, the Chinese government began to voice protests over proposed 
drafts of the text.  The LDP Secretary General implied that the screening process would 
be used to correct the text, but LDP hawks and JSHTR members forced a retraction of 
those comments, indicating their political strength.
103
 
 Finally, in spring 2001, MEXT approved a final version of the text.  The Ministry 
indicated it would request no further revisions.  The Chinese and South Korean 
governments immediately protested.  The Chinese government went so far as to request 
changes to eight specific points in the text, a request that MEXT refused.  The Chinese 
government persisted in insisting that Japan take serious and effective measures to correct 
this textbook issue.
104
  MEXT's grounds for refusing the Chinese request was that it 
should not request further revisions after the text's approval, and that the local education 
boards were responsible for choosing which text to adopt.  This strategy allowed MEXT 
to avoid responsibility for controlling the text and facing the wrath of the JSHTR as well 
as trying to undermine the influence of teachers on the textbook adoption process by 
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favoring the education boards.
105
 
 Several educational boards in Japan considered adopting the text, but met with 
enormous grassroots opposition from parents and teachers within the affected districts.  
In the end, only two educational boards selected the text for use. The Tokyo Metropolitan 
Education Board and the Ehime Prefectural Education Board both selected the text for 
use in a few schools and classes for disabled children.  For both of these locales, board 
members who promoted the text owed their positions to governors sympathetic to the 
JSHTR. A small number of private schools also adopted the text, bringing its total market 
share to 0.039 percent in 2002.
106
 
 JSHTR's goal had been to gain 10 percent market of share with their text, so this 
was a considerable failure of the group's stated goal, despite the political influence that 
allowed them to gain approval of their text in the first place.  As a Level II coalition, they 
were able to successfully resist the influence of China on their approval process, even to 
the degree of fighting off official but non-binding comments made by political figures. 
But, as a simple domestic policy group they were not successful in achieving their 
ultimate goal.  Their political influence was greater than their popular influence, even 
with such members as influential manga artist Kobayashi Yoshinori.   
 2001 also saw the first of several infamous Yasukuni Shrine visits by prime 
minister Koizumi.  Koizumi had promised to visit the shrine in April during his bid for 
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the LDP presidency and while the JSHTR’s text was in the final stages of the approval 
process.  China again protested, and after discussion, Koizumi agreed to make his visit in 
August 13
th
 rather than the 15
th
.  The issue of Yasukuni Shrine was more serious than the 
textbook issue in China's eyes due to its perceived glorification of Class A war criminals.  
However, the textbook controversy fed into the diplomatic response made by the Chinese 
government, and into popular reactions from Chinese citizens who observed  the 
Japanese government, as it approved a nationalist text and then allowed their leader to 
visit the shrine. 
 The Yasukuni Shrine and the textbook controversy are linked because they both 
tie into Japan's wartime legacy.  The textbook controversy frequently involves MEXT's 
requiring of changes to descriptions of WWII-era events involving Japan.  This in turn 
would affect how a young person educated with such narratives would view the legacy 
represented by Yasukuni Shine and its millions of war dead—whether they are sacrificial 
heroes or wartime oppressors and destroyers.   
 At Level I, China was not able to successfully prevent Koizumi from visiting the 
shrine, though they were able to influence the choice of date slightly.  China was also 
unsuccessful in effecting changes in the JSHTR's textbook.  Japanese conservatives and 
even less politically citizens saw this attempt as a gross overreach by China into Japanese 
domestic affairs, fueling anti-Chinese domestic sentiment.  This Level II reaction 
certainly affected the Japanese government's response to refuse, though the refusal was 
also motivated by Japan's territorial pride.  Accepting direct orders from China about how 
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it can educate its children is not something Japan can do and retain influence as a nation.  
The Chinese popular reaction was predictably fierce, with bloggers and other 
commentators condemning Japan's insensitivity and refusal to grapple with its war guilt. 
 Given the poor reception of the text by the public, one might think the textbook 
controversy would simply die down at that point.  This was not to be the case, though it 
fell onto the back burner for several years.  Fed by sensationalistic media, Chinese 
citizens carried a simmering resentment of Japan's altered depictions of history, 
resentments that resurfaced once again in 2005.  
 2005 
 The next regular textbook screening cycle took place in April of 2005.  Once 
again JSHTR put an edition of their text through screening, and managed to receive 
approval. Once again, struggles erupted throughout the country over the adoption of the 
text.  The 2005 JSHTR text was a revised and polished edition of the 2001 text, and 
contained much of the same objectionable content regarding Japan's political direction 
and descriptions of wars in Asia.  
 There was greater nationalist momentum within Japan in 2005, after a series of 
reports about the abduction of Japanese citizens to serve as Japanese teachers and 
translators in North Korea.  However, domestic opposition remained strongly set against 
adoption of such a politicized text, and so the market share of the 2005 edition was only 
0.39 percent.107  This is a roughly tenfold increase from 2001, but still represents only 
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about 5,000 copies in use anywhere in Japan. 
 This was another sound defeat for the JSHTR on the domestic front, and their 
membership which had been in decline finally splintered, with some members going on 
to form yet another textbook reform society.  The impact of the JSHTR's latest effort in 
China was much more profound, however, as violent anti-Japanese protests broke out in 
major Chinese cities, then rapidly spread via internet and SMS messaging through 
twenty-five other Chinese cities.  These anti-Japanese demonstrations were terrifying in 
their scope and resulted in damage to a number of Japanese businesses in different cities.  
 The Chinese government had difficulty containing the demonstrations, not just 
due to the logistical problems of riot containment.  The government faced difficulties in 
trying to ease the rage of protesters without enforcing a clampdown that would 
undermine government legitimacy..  They had already tried to black out news of the 
protests to prevent their spread, but technology had outpaced them in allowing protesters 
to communicate through alternate means.108 
 The textbook approval was just the final straw in several Sino-Japanese incidents 
brewing in the same year.  Koizumi refused to stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, though 
he would not make another visit until October.  His refusal continued to anger Chinese 
citizens and the Chinese government continued to refuse any high-level meetings with 
Japan.   
 2005 also marked a high point in the Japanese government’s ongoing efforts to 
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secure a seat on the UN Security Council.  Brazil, India and Germany were also seeking 
admission in an attempt to widen the Security Council.  After initially cooperating with 
these countries,  Japan eventually separated its bid and tried to vie for a Security Council 
seat alone, but was still frustrated in this attempt, particularly by China. 
 Japan's bid for a Security Council seat was met with an incredible nationalist 
reaction in China.  It seemed like a blatant power grab to many citizens, and distrust of 
Japan boiled over into furious online and media discourse condemning Japan's evil 
actions of the past.  Twenty-two million Chinese citizens signed a petition aimed at 
persuading the Chinese government to actively oppose the Japanese bid.109  It was 
unlikely that China would ever have supported Japan's petition, but the Level II response 
made it completely impossible for Beijing to take any action but to vote against.  Since 
Security Council additions must be unanimous, the bid was quashed. 
 This combination of events lead to an incredible level of anti-Japanese opposition 
from the Chinese people, who had been hearing negative stories of Japan's behavior for 
years.  To have all of these events occur in a short time was certain to provoke some 
outrage, but the scale was unprecedented and frightening not just to Japan, but also 
seemingly to the Chinese government.  Official protests were issued to the Japanese 
government over the textbook issue, though this time they did not go so far as to demand 
specific alterations.  Citizens were the ones to press the case against biased Japanese 
textbooks. 
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 Within Japan, the nationalists had failed to secure the adoption of their textbook 
in schools, though the War-bereaved crowd still got their shrine visits, as much to thwart 
the objections of other nations as to support the war dead.110  The “normal nation” 
supporters also lost in their international ambition, the UN Security Council bid.  Japan 
would have benefited tremendously from such an increase in international prestige, and 
so this failure was a serious blow to their goals.   
 Still, in every case, these Japanese nationalist groups at Level II were able to push 
their agendas forward with the Japanese government, in some cases very much in the face 
of international outrage and objection.  To some degree this was simply a result of 
Koizumi's leadership, as he sought to manage his domestic agenda, when necessary at the 
expense of international diplomacy at Level I.   
 Chinese History 
 Why does China care so much about what history is learned by Japanese children?  
For texts that faced such opposition and limited adoption within Japan, the Chinese 
response seems somewhat out of step with the offense, such as it is.  Riots in twenty-five 
cities quite the response to a book that sold 5,000 copies at its height.   
 As it happens, Chinese textbooks for children are not terribly balanced either.  All 
textbooks for use in Chinese schools are written by the state—there is no private textbook 
market, approved or otherwise.111  The content of Chinese textbooks shifts with the 
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political wind as a result of this, and since the 1990s they have introduced steadily more 
material demonizing the “Japanese Fascists” for their actions in the Second Sino-
Japanese War.   
 The narrative in these modern texts focuses on the victimization of China by 
foreign powers, especially Japan, and exonerates some previous devils of the pre-
revolutionary days such as General Tso and even the KMT for their shared resistance 
against the Japanese.112  These texts also fail to give much space to failures of the 
Communist regime.  The Great Leap Forward is barely addressed, the Tiananmen 
Incident is not even mentioned, and China's invasion of Vietnam and border war with 
India are ignored.113   
 For China to fling accusations against Japan over textbooks while its own school 
system practices egregious revisionism at every turn seems hypocritical.  Japanese 
citizens are not unaware of the content of these Chinese texts, and this has factored into 
the Japanese popular response to China's protests over the textbook controversy.  Japan's 
wartime actions in China were tremendously destructive, though an argument can be 
made that the CCP regime did a pretty good job at destroying things as well. 
 The reason that China continues to harp on Japan's textbook approvals lies in the 
wartime history between the two nations, and possibly to score small diplomatic victories 
over Japan.  The Chinese leadership is certainly aware of the parallel between Japan's 
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textbook censorship and their own, but the narrative of national humiliation and patriotic 
struggle requires a Chinese response whenever that legacy of the past is extended through 
disavowals of atrocity.  
 In addition to this, there is a struggle between China and Japan for regional 
influence.  Japan has struggled with economic slowdown while China has grown 
tremendously in recent years.  This has left the two powers in competition for influence 
over their neighbors, and over regional institutions such as ASEAN.  When China pushes 
Japan on history issues they can often force a retreat, though not generally a capitulation.  
Formal Level I protests from China have the effect of pushing China's influence on 
Japan, and play very well at Level II with popular nationalism, shoring up support for the 
regime. 
 Since 2005, there have been no further textbook controversy flareups.  The 
JSHTR has splintered after the 2005 text was unable to win public acceptance.  A new 
group formed in its wake and announced its intention to seek approval for another edition 
of the text.  The last screening cycle began in 2009 without any public outcry over 
submission by JSHTR, and their website still announces the 2005 version.  The low sales 
and harsh criticism of previous texts might have made it difficult to find a publisher.114  
There have been no protests from Japan's neighbors.  The future of the controversial text 
is uncertain. 
 Japanese textbooks not explicitly published under a political banner contain fewer 
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references to Japanese atrocities now than they did in the 1990s.  In January of 1999, as 
publishers were preparing texts for the next screening cycle, MEXT asked publishers to 
make their texts more “balanced” and reconsider their choices of authors.  This was the 
beginning of the “self-censorship” movement by MEXT, which tried to get publishers to 
alter texts away from controversial descriptions themselves.  This was done in order to 
avoid the negative reaction to MEXT's direct interference or requests for changes.115 
 MEXT's pressure on publishers to “self-censor” during the early years of the 
century seems to have been effective in rolling back some level of education about 
Japan's wartime past.  However, with the change in government and the failure of 
nationalist texts to find traction, perhaps the pendulum will swing back again and permit 
greater examination of these past events. 
 It is difficult to truly refer to the textbook controversy as “resolved.”  Even if 
Japan gave in to all of China's demands on one screening cycle, the next might bring an 
entirely new load of objectionable material.  The latest cycle has passed without protest, 
however, which suggests some hope for years to come.  2010 has seen one of the most 
furious diplomatic incidents in years in the form of the trawler incident, and having the 
textbook controversy flare up again close to that time could only have added fuel to the 
fire.   
 Conservative groups remain powerful in Japanese politics, and their influence will 
continue to affect Sino-Japanese relations.  Level II maneuvers like the JSHTR's textbook 
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may not be intended to influence relations directly, but it is a common thread among 
Japanese nationalist groups to desire Japan to be strong and internationally respected.  
Resisting demands from China and other neighbors is a part of this perception. At Level 
I, Japan cannot allow China to control what the nation will teach its children.  This is a 
gross breach of Japanese sovereignty, and wholly intolerable to domestic coalitions—in 
other words, even if the government drafted an agreement, it would never be ratified. 
 The Chinese government, meanwhile, feels it must protest each occasion when 
Japan fails to grapple with its wartime legacy.  This is a maneuver that enhances Chinese 
influence by provoking Japan, but it is also required by nationalists at Level II in order to 
maintain the government's role as national defender.  Jiang Zemin's successors have tried 
to soften some of the rhetoric about Japan in both government and popular media, but a 
good scapegoat is a hard thing to give up.  As well, Japan really has not addressed 
portions of its wartime legacy, though the utility of international pressure to force such 
examination is questionable. 
 If the JSHTR is unable to bring another edition of its text to market in the near 
term, it may be possible for the controversy to slip quietly into memory on its own.  The 
Japanese textbook market is ultimately a Japanese matter, and how the nation chooses to 






Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
 Koizumi is often blamed for bringing Sino-Japanese relations to their lowest point 
since 1972 with a few simple strokes.  He made deliberate choices that alienated the 
Chinese in order to bolster his domestic standing (most notably his choice to go to 
Yasukuni Shrine), moves he considered necessary to look tough in response to Chinese 
demands and preserve his conservative standing while he tried to implement a 
complicated slate of reforms.  Still, he did not create the fragile conditions that allowed a 
symbolic gesture to create such damage. 
 The ultra-nationalist domestic faction in Japan is still strong, though the change of 
government has altered their fortunes.  Even during the reign of the LDP, they were 
unable to completely dominate Japanese politics or cultural discourse.  Nevertheless, they 
are a factor within international relations, and occasionally take actions which require the 
government to intervene or react, such as building lighthouses on the Senkaku Islands.  
When confronted with the dilemma of supporting their reckless private citizens or 
pleasing and conceding to China, Japan has thus far generally chosen the former.  The 
current government's choice to avoid the Yasukuni Shrine is a positive step in the arena 
of Sino-Japanese relations, a move taken over conservative objections. 
 The Chinese government has huge problems of its own, many of them having 
nothing to do with Japan.  The use of nationalism as a solution to some of those problems 
has proven to be a double-edged sword, however.  The ideology of Communism was no 
longer useful.  Something else had to warm the people's hearts towards the CCP and the 
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pain of reform.  Nationalism and a narrative of victimization at the hands of foreign 
powers provided a compelling rallying point, especially in the disillusioned wake of 
Tiananmen.  For China, the use of patriotism has been very successful in giving populist 
movements new targets to focus their anger upon.  That one of these targets is Japan 
could be seen as simply an unfortunate side effect. 
 This sense of historical injustice has created a situation in which the Chinese 
polity cannot accept many compromises with Japan.  While Chinese government officials 
do not have to struggle for re-election in the manner of democratic societies, there is very 
real populist pressure upon leaders, and the internet allows commentary and opinion 
formation in almost real time.  Young citizens enraged by China's treatment in history 
demand action from their leaders.  Beijing is left with few opportunities to negotiate 
when historical issues with Japan are in play. 
 The stability of the domestic coalition must come first, before any international 
agreement can be reached.  For leaders insecure in their position, this can mean that no 
possibility of agreement exists while they remain in office.  Leaders are not unitary 
actors, able to make policies in a vacuum, but they will place their own political interests 
first inasmuch as they can weave these in with the interests of the nation.  It was far more 
important to Jiang Zemin to try and shore up his personal position by lashing out at Japan 
than to try and strengthen bilateral ties.  It was far more important for Koizumi to secure 
the support of the War-bereaved Society for his domestic suite of reforms than to try and 
draw China closer.   
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 To some degree, this strategy is rational. International trade between China and 
Japan has grown steadily with only the very slightest of ripples during the 1996 Taiwan 
Straits crisis, allowing the nations to reap the benefits of contact with each other despite 
the lack of warm political relations. Leaders have managed to reap great domestic 
political benefits for their agendas by maintaining this rivalrous tone without disrupting 
the vital flow of trade. 
 The diplomatic roadblocks represented by the three cases in this thesis are serious, 
though only the East China Sea dispute involves physical territory.  This conflict over 
resource division is complicated by historical grievances involving claims on the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.  Two-level game theory as expressed by Putnam tends to 
assume that Level II concerns which have an impact on Level I negotiations will 
normally be expressed solely through domestic channels, such as lobbying efforts 
directed at a legislative body or protests staged within the home nation.  In the case of the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, domestic actors can force confrontations at Level I through 
individual action, such as the case of Zhao Qixiong, the fishing trawler captain who 
created an enormous diplomatic row through his decision to fish near the contested 
islands.   
 Citizens who go to the islands to protest are speaking directly to Level I concerns, 
without going through normal channels of international communication assumed by Two-
level theory.  This additional dimension of communication makes it difficult for both 
governments to exercise full leadership over the situation, as their efforts can be short-
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circuited at virtually any time.  The political forces that support each nation's claims on 
the islands have very strong views about the rightness of their positions, and so are 
willing to risk individual action to try and push for a favorable outcome.  However, each 
time this occurs, tension is raised considerably between China and Japan.   
 Some joint development plans exist for the resources in the East China Sea, but 
China's drilling of the Chunxiao field may force a confrontation before those can come to 
fruition.  The row over the fishing trawler caused yet another cancellation of high-level 
talks between China and Japan, with China stating that Japan had “ruined the 
atmosphere” for any discussion, amidst anti-Japanese demonstrations that continued to 
break out in China.
116
     
 Working out territorial disputes is always made more difficult when meetings are 
canceled due to inclement history.  Koizumi's Yasukuni visits caused a great rift in Sino-
Japanese relations, and prevented any progress on many issues for several years.  
Initially, Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine to win the favor of the War-bereaved 
Society, but this rapidly turned into a position of resistance to foreign pressure as China 
and Korea continued their protests to his visitations.   
 The Yasukuni Shrine is a curious monument, at once solemn in its grief for young 
lives lost to war, and seeming to edify the individuals and institutions that created the 
suffering of war in the first place.  This conflicted presentation makes Yasukuni an 
uncertain presence even in Japanese consciousness, with protesters speaking out against 
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the shrine even as thousands flock to worship there. 
 For the Chinese, the shrine represents the worst elements of Japan's Imperial war 
legacy.  The enshrinement of the Class A war criminals and the Yūshūkan museum exist 
on the same grounds to glorify Japan's military past.  Ordinary citizens visiting Yasukuni 
Shrine to grieve for loved ones is not enough to provoke Chinese anger, however.  That is 
reserved for when leaders in government visit the shrine.  Then, it seems to be an official 
validation of all the shrine's flaws and official sanction to a dark past.   
 The barrier of history between China and Japan solidifies as China protests 
Japan's insensitive action, and Japan resists China's interference in what it terms internal 
matters.  Level I is an incompatible win-set, with China demanding no visits and Japan 
asserting its right to visit.  The impetus to visit the shrine on Koizumi's side came from 
Level II concerns, primarily groups such as the War-bereaved Society, whose political 
influence was vital to his agenda.  On the Chinese side, citizens are keenly aware of the 
viciousness of wartime atrocities visited upon China by Japan, and want Japan to address 
this legacy squarely in apology.  Failing that, they want Japan not to disrespect the 
memories of victims of the war by glorifying vicious deeds, and the Chinese leadership 
has woven a narrative in which they are the sole defenders of Chinese dignity and pride. 
 The Yasukuni Shrine's major controversial point remains its enshrinement of 
Class A war criminals.  While the War-bereaved Society has never considered advocating 
the removal of these tablets solely to appease the sensibilities of other nations, they have 
formed a study group to give the matter consideration after the revelation that the Showa 
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Emperor had avoided the shrine after 1978 until his death because of the Class A 
presence.  Shrine officials continue to resist the dis-enshrinement of these individuals, but 
their removal might lessen the international historical affront at Yasukuni Shrine.  
Renovation of the Yūshūkan would further reduce Yasukuni's association with 
militaristic values in Japan, though there is far less pressure to enact changes in the 
museum.   
 Lacking such changes, however, the shrine remains a lightning rod of controversy 
when government officials patronize it, and is a crisis almost waiting to happen the next 
time a leader comes along in need of the domestic capital that the War-bereaved can 
provide.  The LDP, currently out of power, may be driven farther into the arms of their 
staunchest supporters in order to restore their coalition.  This has not occurred yet, and 
the DPJ government has avoided the shrine. 
 There is no easy solution to the Yasukuni Shrine issue beyond saying “prime 
ministers and other government officials should not visit.”  Certainly, the lesson of the 
Koizumi years has impressed itself on successive prime ministers to avoid visiting, 
though the shrine's existence remains a sore point for some Chinese observers. 
 This battle over historical legacy has found another focus in the last three decades 
as Japan's textbook screening process has come under repeated domestic and 
international criticism for de facto censorship of controversial topics in history.  In 2001, 
the approval of a right-wing textbook came alongside Koizumi's initial promise and visit 
to Yasukuni shrine, drawing a strong protest from China that included demands for 
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specific changes to the text in question.  Japan refused these demands as too intrusive to 
their domestic affairs.  The text met with considerable domestic criticism as well and was 
adopted by less than one percent of school districts.   
 In 2005, a new edition of the right-wing text was adopted.  This time, massive 
protests broke out in many Chinese cities as Japan made an unsuccessful bid for a seat on 
the UN Security Council, and Koizumi refused to cease visiting the Yasukuni Shrine.  
The scale of these protests was unprecedented, and modern technology allowed 
organizers to spread the demonstration even around an official news blackout. 
 The conservative group that drafted the text was acting solely on domestic 
concerns, wishing to instill what they felt to be a proper sense of national pride in young 
people and push the conservative Japanese agenda.  However, this agenda comes at the 
price of whitewashing Japan's Imperial past, describing the Second Sino-Japanese War as 
a war of liberation from western oppression and denying events such the Nanjing 
Massacre and the Comfort Women scandal.  These beliefs run roughshod over the 
sensibilities of nations that were victimized by Japan, including China.  Once China and 
other nations protested, this group and others added their pressure to the government at 
Level II to resist the intrusion of foreign powers into how Japan would teach its children.  
 The incredible response of the Chinese people in 2005 put considerable pressure 
on the Chinese government to formulate a strong response.  The ratification of the mob is 
perhaps the final stage of approval for any agreement, formal or informal.  In the case of 
the textbook controversy, there was no agreement made—Level I again had no 
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compatible win-set.  Japan would not let China direct its educational policies in even 
small ways.  China, meanwhile, was unlikely to ever support Japan's UN Security 
Council bid, but enormous Level II response against Japan prevented any such 
possibility. This is another case in which “tied hands” created no advantage for Beijing, 
as they gained nothing diplomatically with Japan but had to quell considerable unrest at 
home.   
 The JSHTR's textbook has fallen out of public view since 2005, and this leaves 
the textbook controversy unresolved but perhaps hopeful.  The Ministry's screening cycle 
is every four years, and the latest year for the right-wing text would have been 2009.  
Lacking any protest for that, it seems likely that some obstacle prevented submission or 
approval, allowing a respite at the very least.  Where Japanese dialogue on textbook 
content will end up is difficult to predict.  The battle for historical memory in the 
Japanese consciousness is not over, and likely never will be.  
 The influence of nationalism is very visible in all three of these cases.  Nationalist 
goals in Japan may be pursued without attention to the Level I implications of their 
actions, such as in the textbook controversy or initial Yasukuni Shrine visit.  However, 
once international protest is triggered, conservative response is often uniformly stubborn, 
demanding that their government refuse to submit to international pressure.  This 
stubbornness is rooted in a desire for Japan to be a strong nation, an influential nation.  
The term “normal nation” is often used as a catch-all phrase for discussion of military re-
armament of Japan in the vein of such strengthening.  This kind of discussion must nearly 
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always include suggestions to repeal Article 9, or the “peace clause” of the Japanese 
constitution.   
 Such discussion always raises the suspicions of Japan's neighbors who keenly 
remember the ravages of Japanese soldiers in WWII.  The fear of Japanese militarism in 
the region remains strong even decades after the war.  A Japanese newspaper poll in 1995 
asked respondents if they ever thought Japan would be a military power again.  Seventy-
four percent of Japanese respondents answered that they did not think Japan would ever 
become a military power again, with just 18 percent saying that it may become one.  In 
contrast, 56 percent of Korean respondents felt that Japan may become a military power 
again, and 26 percent felt that it already was.  Chinese respondents were about fifty-fifty 
on whether Japan would again become a military power.
117
  This is fifteen year old data, 
and Chinese perceptions of Japanese militarism have very likely increased in the interim. 
 This gulf of perception can only lead to misunderstanding.  When Japan increases 
SDF capabilities, China frequently interprets this as a threat to itself as a result of such 
attitudes towards Japan.  Chinese nationalistic beliefs that originate in the patriotic 
educational narratives disseminated by the state focus on Japanese militarism as one of 
the great evils of the 20
th
 century.  When Japanese officials seem to pay homage to 
Japan's military legacy through Yasukuni Shrine, the Chinese are offended, but also 
worried.  Likewise, when the Japanese educational system seems to fail in what the 
Chinese perceive as the Japanese duty to face the legacy of the Second Sino-Japanese 
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War.    This barrier of history impedes the creation of trust between the two regimes, and 
communication has been slowed or nearly halted more than once by historical issues.  
 This historical barrier creates troubling implications for security.  The suspicion 
of each nation's military buildup feeds paranoia.  The hostility that China heaps upon 
Japan whenever the history issues are raised drives Japanese conservatives and 
sometimes even moderates into a defensive position which in turn feeds into Chinese 
nationalist condemnations of irresponsible Japanese treatment of history.  This cycle is 
toxic, and difficult to bring to a halt. 
 The East China Sea dispute creates the greatest security concerns, given the 
openness of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands to determined individuals.  The most serious 
international incidents involving the islands have all been the result of private citizens 
taking matters into their own hands, with tension-raising results.  Additionally, Chinese 
incursions by both research and military vessels into the Diaoyu/Senkaku waters have 
plagued the region with additional security concerns.
118
  It was only in this year that an 
agreement was reached to re-establish a hotline between leaders in order to facilitate 
rapid communication to defuse confrontational incidents between official agents.
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 Though communication measures have been slow to be implemented, actual 
military action or even confrontation between China and Japan is unlikely.  The loss of 
trade revenue would be a powerful blow to the economies of both nations and cost far 
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more than any such action would by itself.    Still, the instability in relations is illustrated 
by this year's fishing trawler row, in which high-level talks were once again canceled 
through the actions of a rogue individual.  When protesters demonstrated in China over 
the incident, they struck out at Japanese businesses, though they were limited by police 
and prevented from causing serious damage.  The pattern of demonstrating against 
Japanese businesses in China is a familiar one over the last decade, and can only cause 
harm to the bilateral trade relationship that has benefited both nations so tremendously.  
 The current situation in Sino-Japanese relations remains rocky.  Historical issues 
remain unaddressed, though the actions of the current Japanese government have sought 
to avoid aggravating them. Resolution of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands issue seems distant 
and possibly unachievable in the current time frame.  The current domestic climate in 
both countries would not allow for any compromising positions such as joint 
administration.  The East China Sea would probably face similar resistance from 
domestic nationalist coalitions, but in that area of the dispute, the governments at Level I 
have a strong incentive to maintain the widest possible claim in order to retain the 
resources of the sea bed. 
 The conflicts of historical memory contribute greatly to mistrust between China 
and Japan.  Some of this is engineered from the state to the people, in the case of China's 
Patriotic Education Campaigns.  The Chinese regime's quest for economic growth has 
required a great deal of sacrifice on the part of some citizens, and validation of this 
sacrifice requires some kind of victory form the government over a foe, or reward of 
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those who previously suffered for the sake of growth.   
 If China cannot supply the latter, it must at least seem vigilant for the former, for 
defense of China against the threats it claims caused the current situation.  Defusing this 
pressure against Japan will take time, a change in elite policy, and persuasion of the new 
media to give up lucrative stories about Japanese wrongdoings.  It is no easy task, and the 
various levels of Chinese government face numerous smaller acts of resistance that 
threaten the government should they ever turn larger.   
 Japan faces a conservative movement that is in retreat, though still influential.  
China faces mass movements that seek an outlet for many frustrations.  Both nations are 
working towards a future that remains uncertain.  Nationalism plays upon powerful 
human psychological tendencies towards group identification, and shaking that 
identification to permit a broader category or permit compromise of group-identified 
values is difficult.  Careful diplomacy and leadership are required, a great deal of effort 
towards understanding that will face tremendous obstacles from popular values. 
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